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ABSTRACT 
Conventional deterrence failed to prevent open warfare between Britain and 
Argentina over the Falkland Islands sovereignty issue. This thesis investigates the basic 
principles underlying conventional deterrence, and then applies those principles to the 
case study of the Falkland Islands conflict in order to discover why.  This is 
accomplished by examining British political and military planning for the South Atlantic 
region from 1965–1982 for its ability to leverage effective deterrent threats against 
Argentina. Psychological factors concerning the rational actor model and their impact 
upon Britain’s capacity to issue deterrent threats against Argentina are also discussed. 
These two factors are then used to analyze Britain’s credibility and reputation in the 
South Atlantic Region and their effects upon Britain’s deterrence posture. All these 
factors are then taken into account when analyzing the cost/benefit calculus of both 
Britain and Argentina. Thus, Britain’s political and military planning, combined with 
severe psychological limitations, decreased its regional credibility and reputation, which 
severely undercut its ability to affect Argentina’s cost/benefit analysis. This is why 
conventional deterrence failed in the Falkland Islands conflict. 
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I. RELEVANCE OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE 
Si vis pacem, para bellum (If you wish for peace, prepare for war.)1 
 
The end of the Cold War brought about numerous changes in the structure and 
functioning of the international system.  During the Cold War, one of the major debates 
concerned the relative stability of a bipolar world.  After the Cold War, the debate shifted 
to the stability of a multi-polar world. This stance gradually morphed to emphasize a uni-
polar world in which the United States was the leading hegemon. After 9/11 and the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, the discussion once again returned to the relative merits of 
stability and security within a multi-polar world.  
These continual shifts in power relationships change within the international 
community have also required a reassessment of the role of deterrence within it. During 
the Cold War, deterrence was considered primarily connection with nuclear weapons and 
the threat posed by the Soviet Union. After the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, 
nuclear deterrence lost its centrality due to the lack of a global nuclear threat. The 
primary concern of international security became the issue of how to stop the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the one hand, and the suppression of 
regional conflict on the other.  
After 9/11, many policy makers and political scientists believed that deterrence 
was no longer a necessary or a viable component of national security strategy in the post 
Cold War. The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS 2002) released by the Bush 
Administration reflected these doubts.  The report stated that during the Cold War the 
United States faced a “status quo oriented and risk averse [enemy; thus] deterrence was 
an effective defense” against it.2  The NSS 2002 further elaborated that the international 
                                                 
1 As quoted in: Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 7. 




system had “profoundly changed”3 enough after the end of the Cold War that deterrence 
was no longer effective against rogue states and adversaries who were less risk averse 
and not susceptible to deterrence.4 To be sure, doubts about the viability of deterrence are 
not new.  There are numerous historical episodes that support this belief. Despite the fact 
that a war did not break out between the United States and the Soviet Union (deterrence 
success), various destabilizing regional conventional wars did occur during the Cold War 
(deterrence failure.) Some of these regional wars were Korea (1950), American 
involvement in Indochina (1960s–1975), the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Yom Kippur War 
of 1973, the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus (1974), the Falkland Islands War (1982), and the 
Iran/Iraq War (1980–1988).  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The issue of deterrence, especially conventional deterrence, remains relevant in 
today’s security environment. Conventional deterrence needs to be reexamined as a tool 
of U.S. national strategy, foreign policy, and military doctrine given that President 
Obama has publicly advocated nuclear disarmament. President Obama’s emphasis on 
nuclear disarmament further reinforces the need to examine and understand the viability 
of conventional deterrence as an instrument of national security strategy.  
In order to ascertain the viability of conventional deterrence, it is helpful to return 
to the numerous small regional wars that occurred during the Cold War and establish the 
role that conventional deterrence played leading up to the fighting that occurred then. 
Since conventional deterrence takes for granted that the nuclear threat is not necessary to 
affect the cost/ benefit analysis of an opponent, one must examine the small regional wars 
in which nuclear weapons did not play a role or consideration in the conflict.  
In order to direct and set researchable boundaries, the major research question this 
thesis focuses upon is: “Why was conventional deterrence unable to prevent interstate 
armed conflict during the Cold War; and, what lessons can be learned from conventional 
deterrence failures?” In answering this question, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
                                                 
3 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: White House [2002]). 
4 Ibid. 
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“Deterrence did not prevent regional conventional wars and conflicts because the deterrer 
failed to present credible threats that could be used to manipulate the opponent’s 
behavior, activities, cost/ benefit analysis, and instill a fear of unacceptable losses.”  
The Falkland Islands War (1982) is especially well suited as a test of this 
hypothesis.  The war was a regional conflict that involved a major member of the 
Western alliance and a rising regional power, who fought each other for control over a 
small set of islands. Among the conventional conflicts that punctuated the Cold War, the 
Falklands War offers the advantage, from the point of view of studying conventional 
deterrence, of having been fought between two opponents with no prospect of further 
intervention, nor with any likelihood that the conflict might escalate dramatically beyond 
its original dimensions.  These characteristics allow for a more precise analysis of the 
factors underpinning conventional deterrence without having to consider a third party’s 
deterrence attempts. Additionally, although one of the belligerents in the war possessed 
nuclear weapons, there were no conceivable circumstances in which their use would have 
been considered.  This also enables the analysis focus to be solely upon conventional 
deterrence.  
B. THESIS FRAMEWORK 
This thesis will be broken down into six parts. Chapter II will conduct a literature 
review of theoretical literature on conventional deterrence as tools for assessing the 
deterrence failure that led to the Falklands War.  Chapter III will describe the historical 
context that led to conflict between Britain and Argentina. Chapter IV examines the 
political and military conditions that were obviously intended to avert war, but did not. .  
It claims that Britain did not hold a firm position towards the South Atlantic Region; thus 
it could not create, plan, or leverage threats in the form of flexible deterrent options, both 
politically and militarily, in order to deter Argentine aggressiveness. Chapter V discusses 
the psychological factors at play in the decisions by both sides to use force. It asserts that 
psychological factors based upon the rational actor model prevented Britain from 
formulating a coherent policy and military posture that could threaten Argentina from 
taking unwanted actions. Chapter VI covers the concepts of credibility and reputation 
 4
within conventional deterrence. It argues that Britain’s unclear policy and military 
capabilities created doubt within Argentina about Britain’s ability to threaten, thwart, and 
deter its plans for taking over the islands. Finally, Chapter VII analyzes the cost/ benefit 
calculus behind deterrence failure in the Falkland Islands. It argues that Britain’s 
ambivalence to the South Atlantic region failed to demonstrate to Argentina that the costs 
of invading the Falkland Islands far outweighed the benefits Argentina could expect to 

















II. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE 
States have neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies, just 
permanent interests. 
Lord Palmerston5  
This thesis seeks to understand deterrence in general and conventional deterrence 
in particular.  In order to answer the question posed in Chapter I, “Why was conventional 
deterrence unable to prevent interstate armed conflict during the Cold War; and, what 
lessons can be learned from conventional deterrence failures?;” one must first determine 
what deterrence is. Only then, can it be broken down by its principle components and 
tested against the hypothesis proposed in Chapter I by using the case study of the 
Falkland Islands War.  
This chapter will conduct a brief review of the concept of conventional 
deterrence. The first section will cover the various definitions, types, and requirements 
for deterrence. The second section will discuss the interaction and role of policy and the 
military in deterrence. The third segment will talk about the psychological factors in 
conventional deterrence. The fourth section will cover the various aspects of reputation 
and credibility within deterrence. The fifth and final section of this review will discuss 
the cost/ benefit calculations of the decision maker.   
A. DETERRENCE DEFINITIONS 
A large subset of literature on international relations is the study of conflict and 
deterrence. Oliver Ramsbotham defined conflict in the following way: “It is an 
expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values, and beliefs that arise as new 
formations generated by social change come up against inherited constraints.”6 In other 
words, conflict arises as one party wants to change the status quo and the other party 
                                                 
5 As quoted in: Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela R. Aall, Leashing the Dogs of 
War: Conflict Management in a Divided World (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2007), 25.  
6 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The 
Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2005), 
13. 
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resists the change. Deterrence is a means to resist that change. One presumption about 
deterrence is that a state or states can avoid war indefinitely.7 However, as will be 
demonstrated throughout this literature review and the larger overall project, deterrence is 
difficult establish and maintain indefinitely.   
1. Definitions 
Deterrence theory seeks to identify the underlying principles that govern 
deterrence as a strategy.8 It is expected to describe, explain, and prescribe government 
behavior in order to secure a desired outcome.9 Nuclear and conventional deterrence aim 
to accomplish the same task, just by a different means. Lawrence Freedman described 
deterrence as being “concerned with deliberate attempts to manipulate the behavior of 
others through conditional threats.”10 This is generally accomplished either by 
threatening to deny an adversary any hope of achieving his objectives, or of punishing 
him severely for attempting to do so. Patrick Morgan refined the concept of deterrence by 
punishment when he wrote that “the essence of deterrence is that one party prevents 
another from doing something the first party does not want by threatening to harm the 
other party seriously if it does.”11 One of the most commonly accepted methods for 
manipulating an opponent’s behavior is to affect his “cost/ benefit calculation of taking a 
given action.”12 Or more simply put, “deterrence is the generation of fear”13 within the 
opponent that he will fail to attain his goals. John Mearsheimer discusses deterrence by 
denial when he claims that conventional deterrence is “a function of capability of denying 
an aggressor his battlefield objectives with conventional forces.”14 Thus, conventional 
deterrence, whether achieved by punishment or denial, is “ultimately a function of the 
                                                 
7 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 12. 
8 Ibid., 8. 
9 Ibid., 42. 
10 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 6. 
11 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 1 
12 Austin G. Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of Rand 
Deterrence Research (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2008), 7. 
13 Ibid., 7. 
14 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 15. 
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relationship between the perceived political benefits resulting from military action and a 
number of nonmilitary as well as military costs and risks.”15  
The ideas of change and status quo are essential to understanding deterrence. 
Successful deterrence prevents an opponent’s plan of changing the status quo to his 
favor.16 Freedman elaborates on this concept when he states that deterrence during the 
Cold War became a “doctrine so associated with continuity and the status quo, which 
occupie[d] a middle ground between appeasement and aggression, [and] celebrate[d] 
caution above all else.”17 Given the importance of the status quo, deterrence can be 
viewed as a theory about behavior that eventually became narrowly focused on 
preventing military attacks.18 The means of preventing military attack is to create a state 
of mind in an opponent of “unacceptable counteraction” due to the existence of a credible 
threat.19 The existence of a credible threat is essential to persuading “one’s opponent that 
the costs and/ or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.”20 
The potential costs of an action are where the split between nuclear and conventional 
deterrence occurs. Modern conceptions of nuclear deterrence resulted from the capability 
to threaten existential damage and casualties while leaving the opponents military forces 
intact.21 Conventional deterrence necessitates unacceptable losses on the opponent’s 
military forces.  
For the purposes of this thesis, conventional deterrence will be defined as: a 
policy intended to maintain or improve the status quo relationship through the 
manipulation of an opponent’s behavior and cost/ benefit calculus to instill a fear of 
unacceptable losses by the careful application of credible threats. In order to understand 
deterrence, George and Smoke observed the following simplifications and assumptions 
                                                 
15 Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 14.  
16 Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and 
Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 5. 
17 Freedman, Deterrence, 25. 
18 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 2. 
19 As cited in: Ibid., 1. 
20 George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, 11. 
21 Ibid., 21. 
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about deterrence theory (which became the subjects of future discussions on deterrence 
theory): 1) states are unitary players/ actors; 2) actors must necessarily be rational; 3) 
deterrence must have a defined scope; 4) the emphasis of deterrence was placed on 
military threats; 5) deterrence had a tendency towards binary view of commitments (yes/ 
no); 6) restricted to negative influence of threats versus positive influence of inducements 
to affect behavior; 7) inattention to deterrent capabilities at all levels of conflict.22 The 
issues of scope, visible military threats, and deterrence capabilities all impacted Britain’s 
reaction to Argentine aggressiveness during the 1970s and early 1980s. Some claim that 
deterrence theory and strategy are overstretched (in terms of scope) beyond what is 
realistically achievable. Lawrence Freedman is one such person; he states that deterrence 
“covered allies and became ‘extended’, it covered potential enemies thus it was ‘mutual’.  
In times of crisis, it was ‘immediate’; then it became prolonged and became ‘general’. 
And, it attempted to ‘deny’ enemy gains through ‘punishment’.”23 Although, he believes 
that deterrence is overstretched, the above quote demonstrates the overall complexity of 
the international system in which actors apply the various tools of deterrence. Now, that 
the definitions of deterrence have been refined. One can move on to the discussion about 
the types of deterrence.  
2. Types 
There are many different types of deterrence strategies available to states. As 
alluded to in the previous section, there are two main types of deterrence: deterrence by 
punishment or by denial24. Deterrence by punishment is usually associated with nuclear 
strategies, while deterrence by denial is usually associated with conventional military 
capabilities.25  
Either type of deterrence can exist in basic and extended forms. Basic deterrence 
is geared towards protecting the territorial integrity of the state and tends to be more 
                                                 
22 George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, 71–82.  
23 Freedman, Deterrence, 14–15. 
24 Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 14. 
25 T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 8. 
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inherently credible by virtue of its direct link to the preservation of state sovereignty.  
Extended deterrence concerns the protection of interests outside of the territorial limits of 
the state, and is liable to be viewed as less credible26 because the state itself is not in peril 
if deterrence fails. Austin Long states that “basic deterrence [is] not rational but 
credible.”27 The underlying presumption is that if deterrence fails and the state is 
attacked, there is a guarantee that the threatened action will occur regardless of the 
reasons behind the opponent’s actions. Thus, under basic deterrence, a threat is actually 
understood to be a promise.  
In addition to the previously mentioned types of deterrence, it is possible to 
categorize the types of actors and cases in which deterrence is most likely to fail. The 
three categories of actors that impact the success or failure of deterrence are: 1) peer/ 
near-peer competitors; 2) regional powers; 3) significant non-state actors.28 The first two 
types of actors are important for the future analysis of the Falklands case study. This 
conflict involved a declining global power (Britain) that was decreasing its regional 
presence in the South Atlantic Region and a rising regional power (Argentina). Due to the 
decreasing size and capabilities of Britain and the increasing size and capabilities of 
Argentina, the two states were approaching peer/ near peer status.  
According to George and Smoke, there are three types of deterrence failure cases: 
1) fait accompli attempt; 2) limited probe; 3) controlled pressure.29 The first two types of 
deterrence failures will be discussed at greater length below. The fait accompli attempt 
and limited probe are very pertinent to the case study of the Falkland Islands War, 
because this is what Argentina attempted to accomplish by the invasion. 
                                                 
26 Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of Rand Deterrence 
Research, 13. 
27 Ibid., 14. 
28 Ibid., 6. 
29 George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, 536–547. 
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3. Requirements 
One assumption made by George and Smoke and commonly accepted by most 
students of deterrence is that deterrence is not stable over time and subject to change.30 
This difficulty in deterrence maintenance is demonstrated through the requirements for 
deterrence and crisis/ war initiation. George and Smoke put forward three requirements 
for deterrence: “1) the full formulation of one’s intent to protect a nation [interest]; 2) the 
acquisition and deployment of capacities to back up the intent; and 3) the communication 
of the intent to the potential aggressor.”31 From these assertions, a state must maintain the 
capability and credibility to threaten retaliation as part of deterrence by punishment.32 
The maintenance of these capabilities is not sufficient for deterrence success, clear 
communication of intent coupled with the transparency of capabilities is necessary for the 
opponent to believe what he is being told.  
Morgan has a different twist in the fine-tuning of the above three requirements. 
He views the three requirements for conventional deterrence as: 1) capability to fight and 
escalate the conflict; 2) capability to deny; 3) capability to defeat.33 If a state does not 
already have these capabilities, it is a distinct possibility that it will attempt to bluff and 
frighten an opponent as a part of strategic deterrence.34 If war is going to be total, 
ultimate, and put the future of a state at risk, then deterrence must work all the time and 
military forces must be primed and ready to go in case of failure.35 Consequently, the 
risks for a status quo power that attempts to bluff in high stakes deterrence are 
significantly increased.   
George and Smoke claim that deterrence is theoretically more appropriate in a 
bipolar situation where great interests and values are at stake with the promise of 
                                                 
30 George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, 568. 
31 Ibid., 64. 
32 Freedman, Deterrence, 28. 
33 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 25. 
34 Freedman, Deterrence, 7. 
35Morgan, Deterrence Now, 9. 
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horrendous violence.36 Deterrence is definitely easier to manage in a bipolar relationship, 
yet this is rarely possible. Most states have alliances or benefactors that can be used to 
manipulate the cost/ benefit calculus of conventional deterrence. This can be seen in the 
Falklands case.  Upon initial inspection, this is a case of clear bipolarity between two 
states that had diverging interests.  Yet, the United States and other regional actors played 
a significant role in the conflict.  The United States was an ally of Britain and had signed 
a formal defense treaty with Britain under the NATO alliance. Hence, the choice should 
have been clear as to whom the United States would side with in the conflict.  
Nevertheless, the Argentineans believed that the United States would side with them due 
to the United States’ Monroe Doctrine, years of rapprochement, and defense contracts 
and spending.  Additionally, the Argentineans were attempting to acquire nuclear 
weapons and had a nuclear weapons program underway, which the United States was 
attempting to stop.  Hence, the actions of the United States had an important, if indirect 
influence upon the success or failure of the war for either side. Their “bipolar” 
relationship was nevertheless qualified by other systemic connections that altered their 
estimates of their own chances.  
The final and last requirement for deterrence involves four conditions for war 
initiation: 1) presence of serious conflict of interests; 2) the weaker side values higher the 
issue in dispute; 3) the weaker side is dissatisfied with the status quo; 4) the weaker side 
fears deterioration or no change in the status quo.37 Any deterrence theory or strategy 
must successfully manage these factors. If one side is perceived to be bluffing or has a 
high degree of disinterest in the disputed subject area; then deterrence will fail. 
B. THE ROLE OF POLICY, THE MILITARY, AND STATE CAPABILITIES 
Now that the definitions, types, and requirements for deterrence have been 
established, one can focus upon the role of politics and military strategy in deterrence. 
The interaction of the politics, military strategies, and state capabilities is very important 
to deterrence and the outbreak of war. Ramsbotham states that interests are easier to settle 
                                                 
36 George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, 32. 
37 Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers, 16.  
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than positions.38 This is why deterrence is so difficult to build and maintain. Most states 
in a conflictual relationship have positions that must be adhered to, which makes 
deterrence an important backstop against failure of other conflict resolution attempts.   
Patrick Morgan claims that “a severe conflict presumably makes parties more 
willing to fight; it alters their preferences to make their level of unacceptable damage 
higher so it takes more to deter them. A severe conflict expands the parties’ emotional 
intensity, making rational calculation less likely or appealing.”39 This coincides with 
Ramsbotham’s idea about the difficulty of positions. The more strongly a position is held, 
the more likely that a state will fight to maintain that position. According to T. V. Paul, 
states are more willing to initiate war under the following conditions: “1) politico-
military strategy [ability of Blitzkrieg or fait accompli actions]; 2) the possession of 
offensive weapon systems; 3) Great Power defensive support [alliances]; 4) changing 
domestic power structure.”40 This section of the paper will discuss how deterrence results 
from the successful combination of “military strategy and practical politics,”41 as 
Freedman claims. 
1. Policy 
Underlying a states deterrence position is concern about its security interests and 
the stability of the status quo relationships between states. Concern about the 
maintenance of stability may lead to actions that, while intended to preserve it, 
undermine it instead.  If a state enacts measures to increase its deterrence factor, its 
opponent may view these preparations as a clear sign of an imminent attack.42 This type 
of “security dilemma” has the potential to spiral out of control due to both sides 
increasing their relative strengths. According to Jervis, “statesman usually underestimate 
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rather than overestimate the impact” of the security dilemma.43 Thus, statesman can 
approach the brink of war without realizing the gravity of the situation that they are 
creating.  
Although deterrence is primarily a defensive security posture, it has important 
political dimensions and “a successful policy of deterrence must be understood in both 
political and military terms.”44 Prior to the onset of nuclear weapons, deterrence was 
pursued primarily through shifting diplomatic alliances designed to affect the cost/ 
benefit calculus of various states.45 Deterrence became a policy in itself (as opposed to 
one of its tools) when nuclear weapons made deterrence necessary and the bipolar world 
of the Cold War made it possible.46  
Deterrence, credibility, and political objectives are inextricably linked together.47 
Due to this linkage, the severity of the political conflict affected the war outcome and 
effectiveness of deterrence, rather than the weapon type.48 One possible implication from 
this is that nuclear weapons were not the critical factor within deterrence during the Cold 
War and deterrence can still be relevant in the post-9/11 security environment. Even 
during the Cold War, Mearsheimer claimed that “conventional deterrence [was] 
ultimately based on the interaction between the broadly defined political considerations 
that move a nation to war and the potential costs and risks of military action.”49  
Broadly speaking, there are four major policy debates within deterrence: 1) 
rejection of deterrence; 2) minimum deterrence; 3) massive destruction; 4) war-
fighting.50 The third debate does not apply to the Falkland Islands conflict because 
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Argentina did not have nuclear weapons and (as will be demonstrated later on) Britain 
did not maintain the conventional capability of massive destruction. Nor did Britain 
maintain the ability to fight and win at any level. As Morgan succinctly stated 
“[Conventional deterrence] was not the threat of physical destruction so much as 
lowering enemy chances for military success and political survival.”51 The remaining 
three policy debates have an impact upon an actor’s chances of success or failure. All 
four policy debates impact the three levels of deterrence: 1) strategic; 2) limited war; 3) 
sub-limited conflict.52 States must have, create, and use different deterrent policies for 
these different levels of deterrence threats.53 Deterrence below the strategic level is 
concerned with “influencing the opponent’s political calculus of the acceptable risks of 
his potential initiatives rather than simply threatening overwhelming military costs.”54  
Deterrence is inevitably an element of crisis management. A state communicates 
its interests in a crisis by various military and political signals.  After these signals have 
successfully deterred the opponent, the deterrer moves on, deescalates, and shifts its 
focus on to the next problem or crisis. The risk is that the adversary may view this action 
as indifference regarding the original disputed object and hence may take steps that 
reignite the conflict.55 This appears to be the case of the Falklands Crisis, which saw 
British military reductions and public announcements about giving up the islands. The 
wrong impression was sent to the Argentineans regarding Britain’s continuing interests in 
the islands.  
Limited wars, of which the Falklands War is an example, tend to have small, 
narrowly defined objectives, often accompanied by expectations of achieving a cheap 
victory. For deterrence to succeed in such circumstances it must address the “cheap 
victory strategy” of states.56 Paul asserts that “the objective of a limited aims strategy is 
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to create a political or military fait accompli, or an irreversible condition, which may not 
be altered following the conclusion of the war.”57 Thus, deterrence can fail if a state feels 
that it can quickly gain an irreversible cheap victory. Deterrence is also threatened by 
other political means.  “War initiation by a weaker state [is] greater when the power 
structure changes in that state; and when an insecure, militaristic group assumes control 
of the decision-making process.”58 Thus, if there is a political regime change and its 
“legitimacy and popularity are low…diversionary wars can be an effective means to 
attain popular support.”59 
2. Military 
Armed forces are expected to win wars, and to deter them.60  It is generally 
accepted that conventional deterrence will hold and be stable when parity of forces 
between two opponents is roughly equal in size and capabilities. Conversely, deterrence 
will often fail when one side gains superiority of men and equipment.61 To achieve 
conventional deterrence, military capabilities should be such that the cost of full-scale 
conflict becomes profitless.62 The problem with this theory is that it does not explain war 
initiation in an asymmetric power struggle; especially when the relative combat power of 
a perceived weaker state approaches the comparability of a perceived stronger state. 
In addition to the balance of forces theory, three theories on military strategies of 
war exist to explain how the military can affect the outcome of deterrence.  They are 
categorized as: 1) attrition; 2) Blitzkrieg; 3) limited aims (usually terrain based).63 
Blitzkrieg strategies allow for a quick victory at low cost.64 This concept is closely linked 
to George and Smoke’s concept of quick victory. Blitzkrieg requires the ability to open a 
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hole in the front with subsequent penetration, exploitation, speed, and agility to quick and 
effectively route and defeat the opponent.65 When this ability is attained and maintained 
against an inferior opponent, deterrence is most likely to fail. On the other hand, the 
threat of attrition warfare decreases the chances of deterrence failure. According to Paul, 
“deterrence or the chances of war prevention are more likely when a weaker potential 
initiator expects that it will have to fight a prolonged attrition war with a stronger 
opponent.”66 A weak initiator, after a Blitzkrieg fait accompli attempt, will discourage 
the stronger power from conducting a counter-attack due to high political and military 
costs with a prolonged defensive war of attrition.67 It must be reinforced that “a limited 
aims/ fait accompli strategy envisions neither total victory nor unconditional surrender of 
the opponent’s forces.”68  
Huth noted that “a defending state needs the military capacity to respond quickly 
and in strength to a range of military contingencies, and thus be able to deny the attacker 
its military objectives at the outset or very early strategies of an armed offensive.”69 This 
is an essential component of deterrence if it is going to prevent a state from gaining a 
cheap victory.  Paul explains that “if a weaker state can expect successful employment of 
a Blitzkrieg strategy, it may also provide incentive to the state to initiate an asymmetric 
war.”70 In fait accompli strategies, this quick thrust will be followed by a defensive 
strategy to maintain the limited gains “until political settlements can be achieved mostly 
through third party intervention.”71 
3. State Capabilities 
The political and military components of deterrence can be very nebulous and 
difficult to foresee and understand.  Conversely, assessing the capabilities of states are 
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one of the easiest elements to determine.  A lot of information regarding the relative 
strength of states can be acquired through open source intelligence (OSINT) assets. For 
example, Jane’s puts out on a regular basis information about the current force structure 
and weaponry of most states around the world.  Additionally, it is fairly easy to find a 
state’s military doctrine regarding its training methods and capabilities through the 
Internet and various other sources. With the improved capabilities of commercial satellite 
imagery, it is now possible to develop a low-tech geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) 
assessment of closed societies (to include North Korea) military capabilities and 
disposition of forces.  
This easily acquired information is important because states assess other states as 
threats based upon their capabilities.72 Moreover, military power is estimated and valued 
when it is compared to another state, alliance or opponent.  This is done through the 
process of a Net Assessment that estimates the credibility of capability of the party’s 
ability to follow through on a declared threat.73 T. V. Paul noted that “preponderance 
deters war.”74 Peace and deterrence are maintained when great powers have the 
preponderance of power; yet, the chance of war increases as the gap between capabilities 
of the status quo power and challenger states decreases.75  
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN DETERRENCE 
Any strategy of deterrence must take account of psychological factors such as 
risk, signals, perception, cognitive dissonance, rationality, and fear. All these factors are 
best summed the following quotation from Lebovic: “The existential deterrent acquires 
its power from the nonrational world of fear, psychological bias, and uncertainty and not 
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from the rational world of deduction and mathematical precision.”76 This section of the 
chapter will cover rationality, perception, signals, fear, and risk. 
1. Rationality 
Conventional deterrence theory relies upon decision theory, both of which 
embrace the notion of the rational actor.  Rationality can be best understood as “a mode 
of decision-making that logically links desired goals with decisions about how to realize 
those goals.”77 Yet, there exists a vast body of literature that disputes the existence of 
complete actor rationality. This section will discuss the various limits on actor rationality.  
Decision theory claims that actors base their choice of options upon a set of goals 
and the cost/ benefit calculation of attaining those goals. Yet, many students of 
international relations believe that the decision-makers choice of payoffs is focused upon 
“final subjective estimates.”78 These “subjective estimates” in the decision-making 
process are heavily influenced by the following four factors: 1) values; 2) outcomes; 3) 
courses of action; 4) information.79 These four factors are important because they 
encompass decision makers’ beliefs and thought filters; and if they are not taken into 
consideration, then deterrence can fail when it is solely based upon the rational actor 
model.80 Rational decision-making prioritizes goals in accordance with values; but, it 
does not necessarily relate to the “reasonableness” of an outside observer.81  
One modification or alternative to the rational actor model is that rationality 
should be changed to reasonableness. Payne explains that “reasonable typically implies 
much more than ‘rationality’... [it] suggests that that observer understands that decision-
making and judges it to be sensible based on some shared or understood set of values and 
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standards.”82 He further explains that “rationality does not imply that the decision-
makers’ prioritization of goals and values will be shared or considered “sensible” to any 
outside observer.”83 For deterrence to work, one must drop the idea of rationality and 
settle for the concept of reasonableness on the part of decision makers.84  
Since the concept of rationality is in dispute, one must also consider the effects of 
“irrationality” and even “unreasonableness upon conventional deterrence.  Payne states 
that “irrational” and “unreasonable” behaviors are considered behavior far outside the 
shared norms and standards of international life.85 This has important ramifications for 
conventional deterrence theory. One reason for this is that some theorists claim that 
successful deterrence actually depends upon the “irrationality” or “unreasonableness” of 
actors.  
Morgan claims that “our entire notion of deterrence must rest on the existence of 
great uncertainty in the world and considerable imperfection in its decision makers.”86 
One source of this uncertainty is the irrationality of actors. Although some might claim 
that irrational actors cannot be deterred, irrationality can result from relatively rational 
benign thoughts and events. Long claims that “while it might be irrational… for one to 
intentionally use a deterrent threat knowing that it would invite one’s own destruction, it 
is arguable more credible for one to argue that the deterrent threat might be used 
unintentionally as a result of escalation.”87 Thus escalation, which may be a rational act, 
may nevertheless result in apparent irrational consequences.  
Another argument against rationality is given by Long when he claims that 
“making the threat response automatic and hence disconnected from the cost/benefit 
calculation” makes deterrence more credible.88 This is because, no matter what the cause 
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or justification from the opponent is, the threatened action will occur. Unconditional 
commitments tend to turn threats of action into promises of action if the behavior to be 
deterred occurs. Yet, most would agree that “decisions stemming from unconditional 
commitments are not rational.”89 Therefore, irrationality can actually improve the 
credibility of commitments issues, especially when reactions to threats are made 
automatic.90  
Morgan furthers the claim that rational actor theory is not necessary for successful 
deterrence. He states that “it is not necessary to assume rationality to model deterrence 
for description, explanation, and prescription.”91 Morgan further claims that one must 
start with the assumption that actors “are somewhat irrational, not capable of being 
wholly rational, or lacking sufficient time or information to be rational.”92 When some or 
all of these factors are taken into account, it is easier to persuade irrational actors with the 
appropriate threats to make deterrence very effective.93  
The rational actor model is further complicated by the fact that a decision maker’s 
rationality is based upon his preferences.94 According to Ellery Eels, “a course of action 
is rational only relative to a possessed body of information (beliefs and desires) in terms 
of which the merits of the available courses of action can be rationally evaluated.”95 
Jervis points out that statesman need to understand the opponents “framework of 
beliefs”96 and determine “what the [opponent’] intentions are.”97 Determining an 
opponent’s intentions is important because the thought process and behavior behind those  
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intentions are an important part of conventional deterrence.98 The psychological goal of 
deterrence is to “anticipate how [the opponent] will behave in response to… deterrence 
policies.”99   
It is important to discuss how an actor interprets information to determine 
unreasonableness or irrationality. “Thought filters” have an important impact upon how 
actors perceive and react upon information.100 They are linked to the discussion on biases 
(in the following section) and how information is taken in, analyzed, and interpreted. In a 
crisis situation, a decision maker’s natural assumption is that the opponent is irrational.101 
Thus, this thought filter is automatically going to bias how the information is analyzed 
and will portray the opponent as an irrational or unreasonable actor. The higher the level 
of hostility, the higher the level of perceived irrationality or unreasonableness is likely to 
be.102  
In the final analysis, rationality in decision making “under severe cognitive 
constraints,” needs to be a goal rather than a premise of both deterrence theory and 
deterrence as a policy.103 Freedman states that an actor can have rational thinking even if 
it is different from our own,104in which case it is more appropriate to think in terms of 
reasonableness versus rationality.  Jervis claims that generalizations based upon 
motivated and un-motivated biases can replace the rational actor model in deterrence 
theory.105 It is more appropriate to think of biases as supplements to rationality and 
reasonableness rather than as replacements for them.  
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2. Perception, Misperception, and Cognitive Dissonance 
Cognitive dissonance in the form of perception and misperception is very 
important to effective conventional deterrence. If deterrence is going to be successful 
against an opponent, one must understand the thought processes behind their behavior.106 
The psychological goal is to “anticipate how [the opponent] will behave in response to… 
deterrence policies.”107 According to Jervis, “judging others’ intentions is notoriously 
difficult.”108 This has a direct impact upon assessing the role of influence within 
deterrence. As a result of this confusion, “who is attempting to influence whom, and for 
what purpose, is rarely straightforward.”109   
As mentioned above, signals are an attempt to clarify this uncertainty.  Actors can 
attempt to accomplish this by producing a “clear declaratory policy that makes clear what 
is to be deterred.”110 Yet, “clear signals” given by the sender are often received and 
interpreted in different ways by the opponent.(Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1989) A state will 
be perceived as a threat if it “displays a willingness to ignore accepted procedure, a 
disregard of what are usually considered the legitimate rights of others, and an 
exceptionally high propensity to accept risks in order to improve its position.”111 The 
perception of a state’s hostile behavior will be amplified if “the intent to harm will be 
attributed to an actor when observers believe that he could have reached his ostensible 
goal without hindering someone else.”112 One possible result of a state being perceived as 
a threat is that deterrence becomes irrelevant, because potential adversaries believe that 
war is inevitable.113  
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Identifying biases in perception, in oneself and others, is at least as difficult as 
divining an opponent’s intentions. According to Robert Jervis, the brain uses biases to 
process and categorize information. 114 He explains that “biases are ways of treating 
information that diverge from the standard definitions of rationality.”115 There are two 
types of biases, motivated and unmotivated. “[M]otivated biases arise from the emotions 
generated by conflicts that personal needs and severe situational dilemmas pose”116 that 
are not easily resolved. They “serve important psychological functions, primarily 
minimizing the discomfort that would be created by a full appreciation of the negative 
attributes of objects the person values…”117 Motivated and unmotivated biases are an 
important foundation in actor’s perceptions. Perceptions are heavily influenced by an 
actor’s convictions about “how the world works.”118  
One type of motivated bias is that the “needs of decision makers and their states 
can strongly influence whether others are seen as threats, the kind of threats they are seen 
as presenting, and the best way of dealing with the threats.”119 If motivated biases 
dominate, then reasons for policy choices are actually rationalizations (policy first, 
justification follows.)120 Motivated biases create errors that “lead decision makers to 
underestimate or overestimate threats.”121 “When motivated biases are at work, it is 
particularly hard for others to predict the state’s behavior.”122  
On the other hand, “unmotivated biases are the products of the complexity of the 
environment and the inherent limitations of our cognitive capabilities.”123 An actor’s 
“predispositions constitute the most important unmotivated influence on perceptions, but 
                                                 
114 Jervis, Lebow and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 3.  
115 Ibid., 4. 
116 Ibid., 4. 
117 Ibid., 4. 
118 Ibid., 4. 
119 Ibid., 18. 
120 Ibid., 25. 
121 Ibid., 25. 
122 Ibid., 26. 
123 Ibid., 27. 
 24
two other unmotivated biases affect both predispositions and perceptions.”124 They are 
availability and representativeness. Availability is when “a person’s inferences are 
influenced by the ease with which various patterns come to mind.”125 Representativeness 
differentiates what categories objects belong to based upon descriptions without taking 
into account statistical facts behind the information.126  For example, when asked what is 
more dangerous, shark attacks or driving an automobile; most people will instinctively 
answer that shark attacks are more dangerous, despite the statistics that show more people 
die from automobile accidents than shark attacks. A dangerous result of biases is that 
during conditions of poor transparency, actors can be led to believe that their opponent is 
acting irrationally because of unseen internal biases.127 These concepts lead directly into 
the following discussion of conventional deterrence signals. 
3. Signals 
Signals are also very important to conventional deterrence because they indicate 
the general intentions of a state. Given, the importance of signals; it is surprising that they 
are often times ambiguous, not clear, or misread. The goal of a state in signaling is to 
send a “clear declaratory policy that makes clear what is to be deterred.”128 A challenge 
for signals is how to determine when a signal is being rejected versus when it is not being 
received by the opponent.129  
Signals are important because they are an indicator of a state’s behavior, which is 
used as a window to view the value that it places on objects or interests.130 Signals are 
sent by the policy decision makers and the military in terms of intentions regarding issues 
of interest and value.  Freedman claims that “military signals in particular are often 
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notoriously ambiguous, and the problems of interpretation grow in the psychological 
intensity of the crisis.”131 This point will be amply demonstrated in Chapter V. 
Some claim that “democratic states are more capable of communicating credible 
threats in a crisis because democratic leaders face higher domestic political costs for 
backing down in a crisis.”132 This is not always the case. During events leading up to the 
Falklands conflict, Britain sent a horde of mixed signals to Argentina regarding its 
permanent interests on the Falkland Islands. Additionally, the domestic environment of 
both Britain and Argentina further complicated the situation and made it worse. The 
interaction of signals and the Falkland Islands War will be discussed in later chapters.   
Huth elaborates on the difficulties of democracies in sending unambiguous signals 
to their opponents. Clear signals to opponents are more difficult to produce due to 
domestic concerns, including uncertainty as to the degree of domestic support behind a 
given policy. This is further complicated by the fact that governments use war and crisis 
to rally support, or to unite a divided populace. Conversely, a government might mobilize 
its public and hype a conflict to signal the gravity of the situation.133  At a minimum, 
these considerations suggest that democratic states are no more likely to appear rational, 
or even reasonable, to outsiders, than any other kind. 
4. Risk 
Risk is central to any political actor’s cost/ benefit analysis.  Failures to assess 
risk accurately often play a significant role in the unintended consequences of states 
actions that give rise to war. It is important, in this connection, to note the distinction 
between warnings and threats. Long puts forward the following idea: “A warning sought 
to convey the deterrer’s true and inherent interest. A threat, in contrast, conveyed the 
deterrer’s commitment to a position that was not clearly in its true and inherent 
interest.”134 This distinction has serious implications because if a threat is a commitment 
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to a position that is not in a states interest, then the state’s credibility is questionable and 
the opponent’s risk calculations will be affected as well.  
Long also points out that “humans as a rule tend to be risk acceptant when facing 
loss and risk averse toward gain.”135 As a result of this idea, it is important to bring up 
two important points about risk. First, it is a function of the capabilities of the attacker 
and defender. Second, risk is also a function of the relationship between military and 
political implications of going to war.136 Deterrence can fail because of a “complete 
incomprehension of the risks.” For example: “A tourist in a foreign country comes upon a 
policeman who is trying to tell him not to enter a restricted area. The tourist walks on and 
is arrested.”137 Deterrence failed because the tourist did not understand the situation and 
the language of the signals being given to him.138 Jervis points out that “deterrence 
theory requires statesman to balance the risks of confrontation with the costs and risks of 
concessions.”139 
5. Fear 
Thucydides once wrote: “Nobody is driven into war by ignorance, and no one 
who thinks that he will gain anything from it is deterred by fear…[W]hen there is mutual 
fear, men think twice before they make aggressions upon one another.”140 Fear is a major 
component of deterrence. Yet it often requires imperfect rationality, or even irrationality, 
to be effective. Morgan wrote that “deterrence is used not because the opponent is 
rational but in hopes of shocking or scaring him into doing the right thing.”141  Irrational 
fears can also result in deterrence if the decision maker’s fears go beyond the evidence of 
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significant destruction.142 The emotional element of fear and anxiety is beneficial to 
deterrence in another fashion. If an opponent is fearful, credible reassurance “that the 
threatened harm will not be implemented” if the opponent maintains the status quo can 
strengthen the deterrent relationship.143 
D. CREDIBILITY AND REPUTATION WITHIN DETERRENCE 
Credibility and stability are important concerns for the success deterrence.144 
Morgan claims that “credibility is the quality of being believed.”145 It is not sufficient for 
a state to have the capability to destroy, it is equally important that the opponent believe 
in this ability.146 Occasional wars could reinforce reputations and credibility, further 
enhancing general deterrence.147 Press indicated that three important points about 
credibility exist: “1) it is a perception; 2) it is not tangible; 3) credibility of a threat is not 
synonymous with seriousness of a threat. The seriousness surrounding a threat is directly 
related to the cost of the threat.”148 Credibility is linked to whether or not the opponent 
believes in both the threat and the capability to enforce the threats. It is also partly based 
upon past commitments upheld.149 Credibility may be demonstrated through clear 
communications of intent, the will to follow through on a threat, and military 
maneuvers.150  
There are four types of conditional threats that roughly correspond to the various 
types of deterrence strategies: narrow/ broad; extended/ central; denial/ punishment, 
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immediate/ general.151 Central threats have a higher credibility because they impact 
sovereign territory versus a third party.152 Threats based upon denial and punishment is 
also very important to the credibility of deterrence. Threats based upon denial promised 
the opponent that they will not accomplish their objectives, period. Punishment based 
threats promised that if an opponent attempted to get its objective, coercive force would 
be used to prevent them from maintaining it and the costs of the operation would far 
outweigh the benefits.153  
Mearsheimer claims that there are two types of credibility at stake in conventional 
deterrence: credibility of response to whatever behavior is to be deterred, and credibility 
of commitments to sovereign territories or to third parties who may be operating under 
expectations of extended deterrence.154 Yet, the credibility of response and commitment 
are contingent upon the above-described nature of threats. 
One method of increasing credibility is to make the threatened response 
automatic, regardless of the cost/ benefit calculus.155 Deterrence and credibility of 
commitment are based upon the nature and value of interests in dispute.156 Effective 
commitments and signaling are in turn the result of the strength of interest in the disputed 
problem.157 Commitments have an important role in creating a credible capability. The 
aggregate forces of a state, their proximity to the theater of operations, and the state’s 
ability to project power all have an impact upon the credibility of commitment.158 A 
challenge to deterrence is how to maintain a credible threat while seeking détente and  
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cooperation.159 As parity among actors increases, the chances of war between the actors 
increase as well.160 As George points out, commitment falls on the defenders of the status 
quo.161  
Reputation is one of the most controversial subjects in deterrence theory. Some 
claim that “face is one of the few things worth fighting over.”162 Others assert that there 
is no direct linkage between behavior and reputation. “Fighting to create a reputation for 
resolution with adversaries is unnecessary, and fighting to create a reputation for 
resolution with allies is unwise.”163 These discrepancies of opinion are magnified by the 
fact that “reputation is intangible and difficult to measure and identify. It provides an 
intuitive test of the quality of a policy rather than a specific goal in itself.”164 Yet if 
reputation is negligible, hard to judge and calculate, how does one account for actors still 
believing in it and using it in their assessments and judgments?165  
These contradictions were best recapped by Huth in the following three theories 
about the role of reputation in deterrence: “1) strong interdependence of commitments; 2) 
case specific credibility position; 3) qualified interdependence of commitments.”166 The 
role of reputation in credibility is strongest in the first theory; and it is one of many 
factors in determining credibility within the third theory.  The second theory maintains 
that the role of reputation is negligible in a state’s assessment of an opponent’s 
credibility.  
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The controversy over reputation is further amplified due to its dependence upon 
the perception of the opponent and the perception of allies.167 Some state actors view 
recent behavior and actions by their opponents to be symbolic of their future actions.168  
T. V. Paul argues that the reputation and past actions of the stronger power can affect the 
credibility of deterrence, particularly in the context of limited war initiated by the weaker 
side—very much the case in the Falklands conflict.169  In such circumstances, at least, it 
seems clear that reputation does play a role in the overall success or failure of deterrence. 
E. COST/BENEFIT CALCULATIONS 
The success or failure of deterrence as both a strategy and theory is heavily 
dependent upon the cost/benefit calculus of states. This is where the difference between 
nuclear and conventional deterrence is most significant and most obvious. Nuclear 
deterrence is takes for granted that excessive damage can be rapidly inflicted. Hence, the 
short-term costs are readily appreciated, and the difference between the long-term and 
short-term costs becomes unimportant, because the latter are so overwhelming.  On the 
other hand, the difference between the short-term and long terms costs are not readily 
apparent in conditions of conventional deterrence. Short-term costs may appear low, but 
as losses are inflicted slowly over time, the long-term costs increase. Had these long-term 
costs been known at the outset, a state may not have initiated the action in the first 
place.170 This is one of the reasons why the threat of attrition warfare adds to the stability 
of deterrence.  
Deterrence depends on “the manipulation of cost/ benefit calculation and the 
generation of fear.”171 Cost/benefit analysis in turn relies on the assumption that states 
are rational actors and “power maximizers.”172 Yet it is apparent in practice that states 
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often do not fully understand or anticipate the true cost of their actions. The cost/benefit 
calculation often determines whether deterrence will succeed or fail. Cost is directly 
associated with the speed and success of military action; if the action is successful and 
fast, the costs of the operation will be expected to remain low.173 If an attacker envisions 
a quick victory, then war can ensue and deterrence has failed.174 This has major 
implications for the success of conventional deterrence.  If a state maintains a blitzkrieg 
type of warfare capability or the state believes that it can successfully accomplish a rapid 
fait accompli mission, then the chances of deterrence failure are high.  Deterrence works 
if total costs outweigh the total benefits AND an alternative solution to war exists with a 
better payoff.175 Furthermore, conventional deterrence is most likely to succeed when the 
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III. HISTORY OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS/ ISLAS MALVINAS 
Nothing is easier than self-deceit because what each man wishes, he also 
believes to be true. 
Demosthenes, Third Olynthiac177 
The Falkland Islands War (1982) is an example of regional deterrence failure 
during the Cold War.  It involved a former Great Power that still played a central role in 
the Western alliance against the Soviet Union, and an emerging regional power generally 
aligned with the West. This chapter, within the larger study of conventional deterrence, 
will describe the historical context behind deterrence failure that led to the Falkland 
Islands War178 between Britain and Argentina. It will be subdivided into three sections. 
The first section encompasses the time period (1771 to 1965) from the origins of the 
islands sovereignty claims to the involvement of the international community and the 
United Nations in resolving this conflict. The second time period (1965 to 1982) will 
comprise the precursors to the war that started in 1982. The third section will briefly 
detail the events leading to war and the war itself.  
A. ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE (1771–1965) 
The ownership of the Islands has been in dispute since the early 1500s.179 The 
more relevant claims originate between 1763 and 1765 with the French, their settlement 
at Port Louis (Port Stanley,) and subsequently designating the islands Les Malouines. 
However, the French sold their claims to the Spanish in 1765 to avoid going to war. Upon 
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the sale, Port Louis was renamed Port Soledad and the islands renamed Islas Malvinas.180 
In 1766, the British settled West Falkland with over 100 settlers without any knowledge 
of the other settlements on East Falkland. Upon each settlement discovering the other, 
Spain and Britain each demanded that the other leave.181 In 1770, Spain ousted British 
colonists on the islands, which almost resulted in war.  As a result, Spain apologized and 
Britain re-colonized the islands (1771). The new British colony remained only a couple 
years before it was abandoned. Nonetheless, Britain never relinquished its claim to the 
islands and left a placard affirming its sovereignty over them.182 Yet, the Spanish fully 
maintained that the islands and their territorial integrity belonged to them and no one 
else. After Argentinean independence in 1820, Argentina assumed the claim on the 
Falkland Islands from Spain.183 Subsequently, in November 1820, Argentina populated 
the islands, raised their flag, and proclaimed the islands for Argentina.184  
Then in 1831, the Argentinean governor of the islands attempted to assert his 
governments fishing rights in the area and confiscated three American ships.  As a result, 
the USS Lexington sailed to the Falkland Islands, destroyed everything, forcibly removed 
the inhabitants, and declared the islands a government-free zone.185 This action not only 
resulted in serious damage to U.S. and Argentinean relations,186 but it added further 
complications to the territorial claims over the islands.  
Following the American actions and the islands being declared a government free 
zone, Argentina attempted to reestablish its colony (September 1832) on the islands; but, 
the new inhabitants mutinied and killed the new governor.187 Amongst this turmoil on the 
islands, the British returned to reclaim their territory and reestablish its colony. In 
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January 1833, the British re-colonized the islands with the assistance of the HMS Clio. 
The ARA Sarandi attempted to protest the British reoccupation, yet it was outgunned and 
was forced to leave taking most of the Argentine settlers with it.188 In 1840, the Falkland 
Islands officially became a crown colony of Great Britain;189  the Falkland Islands 
Company was created (1851) to handle the economic well being of the colony.190  
Argentina revived its claims upon the islands in 1910 and again in 1927 when the 
colony was extended to include the South Georgia Islands and the South Sandwich 
Islands.191 After World War II and the creation of the United Nations, Argentina has 
consistently argued that the Falkland Islands fell under the category as a decolonization 
issue.192 This stalemate between Argentina and Britain existed until 1965 when Argentina 
began to gain the support of the UN General Assembly. 
B. PRECURSORS TO WAR (1965–1982) 
The precursors to the armed conflict in the Falkland Islands are numerous, yet 
they fall into three main categories. These three categories are negotiations, conflictual 
incidents, and the politico-military situation between the two states.  
1. Negotiations 
Britain was in a quandary. The Falkland Islands were very far away from Britain 
and the logistics of maintaining the islands for a small population were becoming 
insurmountable. Britain wanted to maintain minimum deterrence with Argentina while it 
attempted to get the islanders to consider the transfer of the islands back to Argentina. 
Britain never believed that the Argentineans had a rightful claim to the islands, but they 
wanted to focus their efforts upon their NATO commitments and not have to dedicate an 
expensive military force to what was seen as an insignificant set of islands in the South 
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Atlantic. This is the background in which the UN General Assembly involved itself and 
forced negotiations upon Britain.  
In 1960, the General Assembly passed Resolution 1514 (XV) calling on the 
international community to bring “a speedy and unconditional end [to] colonialism.”193 
In paragraph two of the declaration, it states that all “peoples have the right to self-
determination,”194 and “[i]mmediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-
Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to 
transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories.”195 And finally, it stated that “[a]ny 
attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial 
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations.”196  
In 1965, the General Assembly passed Resolution 2065 (XX) specifically 
referring to the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). It specifically referred back to UNGAR 
1514 (XV) of 1960 by reinforcing the verbiage “of bringing to an end to everywhere 
colonialism in all its forms, one of which covers the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).”197 It 
“[i]nvite[d] the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom… to proceed without 
delay with the negotiations… with a view of finding a peaceful solution to the problem, 
bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of 
General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the 
Falkland Islands (Malvinas).”198 Britain abstained from voting on this resolution when 
this resolution had a potential impact not only upon the Falkland Islands, but on other 
crown colony holdings, including Belize and Gibraltar.  
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In 1973, the General Assembly passed resolution 3160 (XXVIII) in direct 
reference to Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). The Argentineans were gaining support 
for their cause from the non-aligned states in which Argentina was directly praised in the 
resolution verbiage. “Expressing its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the 
government of Argentina…to facilitate the process of decolonization and to promote the 
well-being of the population of the islands.”199 The UN General Assembly began 
treading a fine line between interceding on the part of the Argentineans in blatant 
disregard of the wishes and interests of the islanders who desired to remain British.  
In 1976, Argentina was formally backed by the non-aligned states as personified 
by the document “Political Declaration adopted by the Conference of Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries.”200 General Assembly resolution 31/49 
“Approves the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with 
regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).”201 All these 
resolutions ignored the ground truth on the Falkland Islands, which was that the islanders 
were in fact British citizens and adamantly wished to remain so.  Their vehemence on the 
subject strengthened after the Junta took over in Argentina (1976). From all appearances, 
the UN was ignoring its own mandate on self-determination.  
A solution based on the concept of ‘lease back” first entered into the negotiations 
in 1975. The idea was that Britain would cede sovereignty of the islands over to the 
Argentineans with the islands being leased back to Britain for a certain period of time.202 
However, this idea was scrapped due to the potential of oil exploitation within the 
disputed region of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, and Sandwich Islands.203 This 
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idea kept reappearing in 1976, 1979, and 1980.204 The idea of leasing the islands back 
from Argentina for a period of ninety-nine years finally ended in 1980 when a fierce 
debate occurred in the House of Commons and the Falkland Islands lobby ensured that 
the political turmoil would be too much to broach the subject again.205 After the defeat in 
the House of Commons of the Lease Back Agreement, the Falkland Islanders participated 
in all the negotiations between Britain and Argentina which effectively made negotiations 
more difficult and Argentine success less likely.  
2. Rising Indicators of Conflict 
During the late 1970s, there were many indicators of Britain’s ambivalence to the 
South Atlantic region and Argentina’s aggressive intentions towards regaining their 
“lost” territory. These indicators demonstrated Argentine anxiety and impatience over the 
status of the Falkland Islands and its subsidiary islands, which included South Georgia 
and the South Sandwich Islands. These indicators or incidences were intended to assert 
Argentine sovereignty within the region and gauge British responses to their activities. 
Argentina’s firing upon the RSS Shackleton, its occupation of South Thule Island, and 
chasing Russian and Bulgarian fishing boats out of South Atlantic Waters206 (disputed 
waters of the Falkland Islands area) were some of the incidents that exemplify Argentine 
aggressiveness.  
There were signs, beginning in 1975, that Argentina was becoming restless over 
the Falkland Islands situation. In 1975, the Argentine Foreign Minister told the British 
Ambassador to Argentina (David Ashe) that as a pre-condition for continued talks 
between the two states, Britain should turn a “blind eye” towards the dependencies and 
any potential occupation of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.  Ashe warned 
that if Argentina aggravated the situation, Britain would be forced to respond militarily to 
any attack on the island groups.207 This dialogue occurred prior to the RSS Shackleton 
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incident, the occupation of South Thule Island in 1976, and under a different British 
government. This warning was not followed up by the British.  
Following this dialogue, Argentina aggravated the situation when it attacked the 
RSS Shackleton. In February 1976, the RSS Shackleton went to South Atlantic to explore 
the economic potential of the area and surrounding waters of the Falkland Islands.  As, 
these waters were in dispute between Britain and Argentina, Argentina took it upon itself 
to fire upon the ship, claiming violation of Argentinean territorial waters.208 The 
Argentine military wanted to escalate the incident, but Isabella Peron did not take their 
advice. Further Argentine military action was not taken, and Britain returned to the 
negotiating table to include discussions on the issue over sovereignty of the islands.209  
In late 1976, the military Junta under General Videla took over in Argentina; their 
purpose was to restore order, reestablish economic and political systems, and end the 
insurrection.210 As part of the Junta’s program of correcting national problems, it took a 
more forceful policy towards regaining the Falkland Islands. The Junta sent an armed 
“scientific” party to South Thule Island under the guise of research projects. The British 
discovered the Argentinean presence on South Thule Island in December 1976 when it 
was retrieving a magnetometer placed on the island as part of a research project. The 
landing party from the HMS Endurance found nearly twenty Argentine military 
personnel led by a major.211 The British party from HMS Endurance reported the 
incident to London on January 4, 1977.  The FCO attempted to deal with the situation in 
a quiet unpublicized manner as they feared the public knowledge and criticism of their 
inability to react to this Argentinean aggression.  It also wanted the South Thule Island 
occupation to be kept quiet as the FCO wanted to proceed with negotiations over the 
sovereignty issue of the Falkland Islands. Although the FCO wanted to downplay the 
South Thule Island incident, the Prime Minister was not willing to let this pass without 
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some form of action taken. On January 19, 1977, Britain formally protested the 
Argentinean presence on South Thule as a violation of British Sovereignty.212 The crisis 
over South Thule Island in 1976 and subsequent British lack of military action suggested 
to the Argentineans that Britain did not want a war in the South Atlantic.213  
These incidents represented three periods when Argentina considered going to 
war with Britain and decided against it.  The first period revolved around the RSS 
Shackleton (February 5, 1976) incident in which Argentine naval warships fired across 
the bows of the RSS Shackleton. Lord Shackleton was in the area conducting an analysis 
economic potential and viability within the South Atlantic. The Second period concerned 
the Argentine occupation of South Thule Island in 1976.  If Britain had reacted against 
South Thule, the Junta was prepared to capture the British Antarctic Survey Station on 
South Georgia with follow up plans for invading the Falkland Islands. This did not occur 
because of British diplomatic and non-military protests, and Argentina did not have 
international nor regional support for its actions.214 The third event (that never came to 
pass) occurred in 1977 when Argentina was beginning to plan another island occupation 
in the South Sandwich Islands; however, Argentina tabled these plans.  This was the 
incident in which Britain secretly sent several frigates and a nuclear submarine to the 
South Atlantic as a deterrence measure.  It is doubtful that the Argentine’s knew about 
the secret task force215 and thus this action is difficult to assess as a valid conventional 
deterrence measure since signals must be clear, demonstrated, and transparent. Britain’s 
actions cannot be said with certainty to have met any of these necessary deterrent criteria. 
3. Politico-Military Situation 
A politically momentous year for Argentina occurred in 1976. As previously 
mentioned, the RSS Shackleton and South Thule Island incidences demonstrated 
Argentine growing aggressiveness, and Britain’s reluctance to counter this aggression. 
                                                 
212 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: Vol. I, 77.  
213 Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers, 151. 
214 Ibid., 163. 
215 Ibid., 163–164. 
 41
Additionally, there were changes within the Argentine government that led it on the path 
to war. These changes started under the Peron regime and were accelerated under the 
military Junta.  
After the Junta, under General Videla, took over (1976); Argentina began a 
program of increased military spending, resulting in a severe strain on the Argentinean 
economy. Some reasons behind the military spending and buildup were the Beagle 
Channel dispute with Chile and the Falklands dispute with Britain.216 Initially after the 
Junta’s assumption of control, it planned more belligerent actions to assert its sovereignty 
over the disputed regions in the South Atlantic. However, this aggressiveness subsided 
after 1977 due to Britain moving back to the negotiating table and its ensuing willingness 
to discuss the transfer of the Falkland Islands sovereignty back to Argentina.217  
1981 was also a turning point in the conflict because it marked a return of 
Argentinean aggressiveness following the failure of Falkland Islands sovereignty 
negotiations. The Junta’s growing pessimism about the effectiveness of negotiations was 
reinforced by Ridley’s removal from the FCO (the chief negotiator of the Lease Back 
option), the defeat of the lease-back option in the British Parliament, and Prime Minister 
Thatcher giving the Falkland Islanders veto power within the Falkland Islands 
negotiations.218 This alone was not sufficient for the Junta to take actions. Argentine 
domestic politics also impacted how the Junta responded to the Falkland Islands issue.  
By 1982, the Argentinean people had grown weary of the Junta and its reign of terror.219 
Thirty years of economic and political instability crippled Argentina, a country that once 
had the highest standard of living in Latin America.220 By 1981, Argentinean newspapers 
began to call for the end of military rule.221 Thus, the Junta attempted to use an external 
conflict to bolster its domestic support and offset any criticisms.  
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For Britain, 1981 was also a very important year. Britain and the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) were in the midst of an economic crunch. During 1979-81, the MoD 
overspent its budget222, the conservative party enacted a deflationary policy that 
negatively affected the whole British economy, and the world was in a global 
recession.223  It is against this backdrop that the Nott Defence Review, the revocation of 
automatic citizenship to the Falkland Islanders, and the withdrawal of the lone symbol of 
British commitment to the region (the HMS Endurance) occurred.   
Under these economic conditions, the Nott Defence Review (1981) attempted to 
realistically match ends and means in British defense commitments and spending. Yet it 
had catastrophic affects upon Britain’s conventional deterrence against Argentina. Nott’s 
defense review outlined four main roles for the British armed forces.  They included: 1) 
provide an independent strategic and theater nuclear force for the NATO alliance; 2) 
defend the United Kingdom; 3) provide a major land and air contribution to the defense 
of mainland Europe; 4) deploy a major maritime capability in the western Atlantic.224 As 
a result of this defense review, the size and capabilities of the British Royal Navy were to 
be severely restricted in favor of submarine warfare and land-based maritime aircraft. In 
an attempt to save surface ships, the Royal Navy recommended scrapping the HMS 
Endurance, HMS Britannia, LPDs (amphibious assault ships), and disbanding the Royal 
Marines. Nott decided to scrap the HMS Endurance (over the objections of the FCO), but 
he kept the Royal Marines and the royal yacht HMS Britannia.225 The Royal Navy was 
going to lose two aircraft carriers as well. In addition to scrapping the HMS Hermes, Nott 
and the MoD signed an agreement with Australia to sell the HMS Invincible in February 
1982.226 Both of these aircraft carriers were to play important roles in the Falkland 
Islands War.  
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There were other signals (besides the Nott Defence Review) that demonstrated 
Britain’s reduced interest in the South Atlantic Region. These other indicators were the 
revocation of automatic British citizenship to the Falkland Islanders and the proposal to 
close the British Antarctic Survey Base on South Georgia Island.227 The Falkland Islands 
situation was summed up by Freedman, “Britain was holding doggedly on to the islands 
about which very few [British] people cared, but those few who did, cared strongly. In 
Argentina, everybody cared.”228 
C. THE WAR (SPRING 1982) 
The attack by Argentina should not have come as a shock or surprise to Britain 
since it had cracked the Argentinean diplomatic code in 1979.229 The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) should have been 
able to ascertain credible and updated threat assessments in regards to Argentina’s 
intentions. Yet, as will be demonstrated in Chapter IV, this was not done effectively.  
Once the Galtieri Junta took over in late 1981, they set an invasion timeline for 
the Falkland Islands to occur between June and October of 1982; however due to the 
Davidoff expedition on South Georgia Island, the timetable had to be sped up.230 The 
reason for setting the invasion between June and October was the onset of winter in the 
South Atlantic. This would make any British reaction to the use of force against the 
Falkland Islands more difficult, if not impossible. Also, Argentinean weapons 
procurement and refit would have been complete in October 1982. Argentina had not 
received all of its planned orders for French Exocet missiles, the installation of the 
missile systems on the French-built Super Etendard aircraft was  incomplete, and not all 
the naval ships had been retrofitted to accept new weapon systems.231  
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The Junta’s invasion plan hit its first obstacle when the Argentine Foreign 
Minister Costa Mendez gave a speech on 2 March 1982 in which he implied that 
Argentina would settle the dispute to its own satisfaction. The Argentine Naval Attaché 
reported that Mendez’ speech had alerted the British to Argentine military plans when it 
had not.232  The net result was that Argentina moved up its invasion plans several months 
earlier than when it expected to be fully prepared.  
Then on March 19, 1982, the Davidoff incident occurred. A group of Argentinean 
commercial salvagers, led by Davidoff, landed on South Georgia to scrap an old whaling 
station. When they landed, the planted the Argentinean Flag and sang their national 
anthem. Although this group had permission to scrap the whaling station, they were told 
by the British embassy that they had to check in with the base commander at Grytviken, 
South Georgia Island. When Davidoff refused to follow the proper port of call 
procedures, the HMS Endurance with twenty-one Royal Marines onboard was sent to 
remove the salvagers from the island. The Argentinean government told the British 
embassy that an Argentine ship was on the way to remove Davidoff and his crew.  The 
HMS Endurance held off from removing the salvagers and it was met by three Argentine 
warships, forcing it to leave without removing the Argentineans.233   
By March 28, 1982, it was clear to Britain that Argentina meant to resolve the 
Falkland Islands issue by force. Britain saw increasing proof of intent through Argentine 
naval preparations that consisted of more than a series of training exercises.  
Additionally, the presence of three naval ships to prevent the Davidoff expedition from 
being ejected off of South Georgia Island was proof that the Falkland Islands situation 
could no longer be ignored. It was during this time, just before the actual invasion, that 
the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach, pushed the Prime Minister to respond militarily to 
Argentine aggression. He was one of the few people who believed that a naval operation 
would be successful against Argentina. 234 His actions had the added benefit of giving 
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options to the Prime Minister on how to deal with this worsening situation. After the 
Argentine invasion on April 2, 1982, the British claims for legitimization in the Falkland 
Islands War revolved around three issues: 1) the self-determination of the Falkland 
Islanders; 2) the illegitimacy of using force to resolve a dispute; 3) the right of self-
defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.235  
D. CONCLUSION 
As a result of their choice in going to war, Argentina lost for the foreseeable 
future any chance of regaining sovereignty over the islands. British defense spending 
remained relatively unchanged; yet three aircraft carriers were kept instead of the planned 
two.  It was determined to keep a British surface expeditionary naval capability and the 
airfield on the Falkland Islands was improved to allow for military operations. The 
Falkland Islands became an independent protectorate for which Britain negotiated 
international agreements and provided defense; however, the Falkland Islands ruled and 
administered its territorial waters and those of the subsidiary islands.  
The Thatcher government successfully overcame opposition and remained in 
power until 1990.  She was to become one of the longest serving Prime Ministers in 
Britain.  The Argentine Junta fell in 1983, initiating a liberalization period in Argentina in 
which it returned to a democratic form of government.  All three Junta leaders were 
prosecuted for actions during their reign. Despite all of these changes, the Falkland 
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IV. POLICY, THE MILITARY, AND STATE CAPABILITIES IN 
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CONFLICT 
War is the last of all things to go according to schedule. 
Thucydides236 
Conventional deterrence failed to prevent the Falkland Islands War (1982) 
between Britain and Argentina. This chapter argues that the reason for the failure lay in 
Britain’s inability to maintain a firm position towards the South Atlantic Region; thus it 
could not create, plan, or leverage threats in the form of flexible deterrent options, both 
politically and militarily, in order to deter Argentine aggressiveness. Britain frequently 
gave the impression and appearance that it did not want nor would it fight to maintain 
British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.237 In fact, through disjointed governmental 
policies and military defense decisions, Britain negated any potential conventional 
flexible deterrence options and pinned itself into a corner. By 1982, Britain had to either 
accept either going to war or accept Argentinean sovereignty over the islands. Argentina, 
by the same token, had also pinned itself into a corner that prevented it from backing 
away in the face of British military reaction and global backlash against their use of force 
option. Once their planning assumptions were proven false, the Junta could not back 
down without their government falling.  
The Falkland Islands conflict was an intense dispute for both the British and 
Argentineans with severe geopolitical consequences on both sides. Three elements are 
important to the geopolitical structure of a conflict. They are: 1) the objective of a state’s 
particular policy; 2) the natural and historical context of the conflictual environment; 3) 
the theater of military action.238 Geopolitics attempts to understand the relationship 
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between geographical patterns and political history.  It is also “a theory about  
spatial relationships and historical causation.”239  
There were numerous geopolitical implications for the region involving the 
sovereign control of the Falkland Islands. In 1959, the Antarctic Treaty demilitarized 
Antarctica so that military competition in the area moved to who controlled the seas 
surrounding it. Additionally, there was economic competition between Chile, Argentina, 
and Britain over who controlled the South Atlantic Ocean’s natural resources. Finally, the 
Falkland Islands and their position had a significant geographical influence on the power 
and influence within the region.240  
The geopolitical dynamics of the region were also precarious because of Chile’s 
dispute with Argentina over the Beagle Islands and the control of the Beagle Channel. If 
Chile’s claim to control the Beagle Islands was vindicated then Argentinean access to and 
control over the South Atlantic Ocean would be severely hindered. With Chilean control 
over the Beagle Islands, Argentina feared that Chile might aid the British in providing 
logistical support to the Falkland Islands, which had the effect of decreasing Argentina’s 
influence within the region and made reacquiring the islands more difficult.  
The above geopolitical implications of the region culminated in late March and 
early April 1982. It became apparent that war was approaching and Britain had two 
choices: 1) it could resolve this conflict by negotiations and concessions; or 2) it could 
use force and prevent the Argentineans from having any face saving options.241 As will 
be demonstrated in this chapter this was not an easy decision.  The political and military 
stage had not been set to assure a British victory.  On the international scene, Britain had 
a nominal advantage in the UN as a permanent member of the Security Council; yet in 
the UN overall, it was at a disadvantage because the third world viewed the conflict as a 
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decolonization issue.242 Britain’s support in the UN was further put in question by three 
factors: 1) two of the non-permanent Security Council members were Spain and Ireland 
(both also had contested land disputes with Britain); 2) Jeanne Kirkpatrick, U.S. 
Ambassador to the UN, supported the Argentine cause; 3) Argentina could expect 
support from the Latin American community as a whole.243  
Britain’s failure to plan and reassess its position in the South Atlantic Region 
prevented it from maintaining an effective conventional deterrence stance. The absence 
of British threats guided Argentine politico-military decisions towards a path of war from 
which it could not turn back. Argentina’s policies and military activities forced it to fight 
even when conditions proved that it was not to their advantage.   
A. POLICY 
Britain neither formulated, nor planned, nor enacted a consistent policy in regards 
to the South Atlantic between 1965 and 1982. Argentina on the other hand, had a 
consistent policy in regards to the Falkland Islands.  They had successfully lobbied the 
UN General Assembly to get the Falklands recognized as a decolonization issue despite 
the Falkland Islanders being British citizens.  In 1976, after the Junta took over, there was 
a definite policy and planning shift in priorities within the Argentine government.  
Jervis wrote that “statesman usually underestimate rather than overestimate the 
impact” of the security dilemma.244 Thus, statesman can approach the brink of war 
without realizing the gravity of the situation that they are creating. This dynamic existed 
between Britain and Argentina; neither state expected to go to war, but they both did. 
This section argues that inattention to goals, policy requirements, planning assumptions, 
and ignorance of strategic indicators prevented the British from leveraging effective 
threats against Argentina.  
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1. Goals 
In order to understand how two states went to war, one must examine the goals of 
each state. British governments had little interest in the Falklands. Their focus was upon 
the Cold War and NATO commitments. As a result of this limited interest, the British 
never sent clear signals or threats about its intentions to maintain the islands. Further 
complicating the matter, the British government (after 1971) was too willing to discuss 
and negotiate the island sovereignty issue; until 1975, when the prospect of economic 
resource exploitation appeared. In 1980, when Britain had decided to no longer negotiate 
the issue of the islands’ sovereignty, it did not detail nor plan for credible threats to 
protect the Islands against future Argentine acts of aggression.245  
British hesitance in its South Atlantic foreign policy was due to unclear internal 
policy and conflict. The unclear internal policy resulted from British fears about 
Argentina breaking life support agreements to the Falkland Islands and Britain having to 
resume those duties. In the early 1970s, Britain had successfully shifted some of the 
logistical burden of supporting the islands onto the Argentineans and it was unwilling to 
resume those burdens. Throughout the late 1970s, Britain suffered from budgetary 
constraints that prevented them from investing heavily in a far off remote region of little 
practical significance.246 Thus, British goals concerning the Falkland Islands were never 
clear cut to other ministries within the government as well as to foreign governments, 
especially Argentina.  
Argentina on the other hand had very clear goals in regards to the Falkland 
Islands: they wanted them back.  In the 1950s and early 1960s, decolonization was on the 
global agenda.  Argentina successfully lobbied the UN General Assembly (mostly third 
world states) to list the Falkland Islands as a decolonization issue and several non-
binding resolutions were passed to support this issue.247 Throughout the 1960s up to the 
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mid 1970s, Argentina kept up international diplomatic pressure on the British.  In 1976, 
there was a change in Argentine tactics.  They pursued diplomatic negotiations, but they 
also began to assert their sovereignty claims over the South Atlantic by more forceful 
means.  This included the occupation of South Thule Island, firing upon the RSS 
Shackleton, and chasing off Russian and Bulgarian fishing trawlers within the disputed 
territorial waters.248  
With the collapse of the final attempt at the lease-back agreement between the 
two states and the subsequent failure of negotiations in 1981, Argentina examined 
options for forcing Britain back to the negotiating table.  One option was to break 
diplomatic relations with Britain and end logistical support to the Falkland Islands. This 
would force Britain to resume the expensive burden of the islands. The downside to this 
approach was that it could lead Britain to develop closer ties to Chile, which is exactly 
what Argentina did not want to happen.249 Or, the alternative was to invade the islands, 
take them over, leave a small contingent of Argentine forces on the islands, and then 
approach Britain on the resumption of negotiations.  These two divergent goals (of 
Britain and Argentina) had very significant effects upon the overall planning process, 
conventional deterrence, and leveraging of threats. 
2. Requirements 
The previous section discussed the various goals or lack thereof within the 
Falkland Islands conflict. These goals had a tremendous impact on the planning and use 
of conventional deterrence within the region between the two states. George and Smoke 
state that “deterrence is… a necessary or useful instrument of foreign policy, but the 
correct and prudent use of deterrence strategy is by no means self-evident or easily 
determined in all circumstances.”250 In the case of Britain, since it did not have clearly 
delineated policy goals or objectives, planning for deterrence was highly unlikely. In fact, 
deterrence had worked in reverse.  The Argentineans had successfully deterred Britain 
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from acting within the disputed region until Britain could no longer ignore the problem. 
The firing upon the RSS Shackleton (February 1976), for instance, deterred Britain from 
exploring the economic potential of the region in dispute. This deterrence included 
deliberate and credible threats against Britain’s base on South Georgia Island if Britain 
attempted to remove the Argentineans from South Thule in January 1977.251  Britain’s 
central strategic commitment to NATO caused it to almost completely ignore its war-
fighting capability outside of the NATO theater of operations. Britain professed to follow 
a policy of minimal deterrence prior to the Falkland Islands War.  Yet, when it was 
repeatedly provoked, it did nothing.  Some claim that Britain actually attempted minimal 
deterrence when it sent a submarine and several frigates to the South Atlantic in 1977.  
There is, however, no proof that the Argentines knew of this force’s existence, and the 
British went out of their way to keep knowledge of this task force a secret; which 
suggests, at a minimum, that the operation was misconceived if its aim was deterrence.252 
Thus, Britain’s minimum deterrence is probably best understood as a reflection of its 
indifference to the whole issue outside the NATO framework.  
On the other hand, Argentina actively pursued minimum deterrence to prevent 
and counter Britain’s claim to sovereignty in the South Atlantic. Throughout the 1970s, 
the Junta actively pursued a “security first” policy in which it had steadily built up its 
war-fighting capability253 to counter and threaten Chile and Britain’s influence within the 
region.  
In 1982, the Junta believed that they could attain a cheap easy victory following 
the failure of negotiations with Britain. Thus, British deterrence failed and a war started 
as a result. Britain did not demonstrate a coherent policy that would have convinced the 
Argentinean leadership that war did not offer any prospect of easy victory in Argentina’s 
favor, but might well end in disaster for the government. The decision for war was also a 
profound miscalculation on the part of Argentina, of course, for which its regime paid a 
heavy price. But British conduct made it an easier mistake to make. 
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3. Assumptions 
As part of the planning process, one makes assumptions based upon friendly/ 
enemy capabilities and actions. One major British assumption was that it expected to use 
British forces allocated for NATO roles in out-of-area operations and contingencies.  No 
special out-of-area capabilities existed within the British Royal Navy.254 They were 
prepared to conduct anti-submarine warfare in northern waters, and had given little 
thought to expeditionary warfare. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) considered the main 
mission of the Royal Navy to be fighting the third Battle of the Atlantic, not protecting 
British interests around the world.255  
In 1981, the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessed that Argentina 
wanted sovereignty over the islands. Yet, the JIC assumed that the Argentineans would 
prefer a peaceful settlement to war. The key variable in this assumption was Britain’s 
continued willingness to negotiate the sovereignty issue over the islands, which by then 
was no longer valid.256 The 1981 JIC assessment also stated that Argentinean aggression 
would be preceded by diplomatic and economic pressures ranging from interruption of 
the islands’ air and sea services to an occupation of one of the unoccupied dependency 
islands.257 This process had already started with the occupation of South Thule Island in 
1976. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) believed that if the Falkland Islands 
developed into a crisis, there would be a discernable Argentinean military buildup prior 
to the onset of hostilities.258 This was subsequently proven false. Additionally, the British 
reaction to the Argentine invasion was by no means a certainty. The House of Commons 
and Conservative Party were split on the issue of British reaction and Pym (FCO) was for 
letting the U.S. work negotiations prior to military activity.259  
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The Argentinean’s also made some strategic assumptions that were ultimately to 
lead to their defeat. They assumed that they could create a political and military fait 
accompli action without a British military reaction or a global backlash. This assumption 
was based upon prior successes—the occupation of South Thule Island, Argentina’s navy 
chasing Bulgarian and Russian fishing trawlers out of the disputed waters, and the 
reduction of the British Atlantic fleet.260 As late as April 1, 1982, Argentina did not 
believe that Britain would fight a war in the South Atlantic, although the British task 
force had already put to sea and was re-organizing at Ascension Island. Due to this 
incorrect set of assumptions, the Argentineans did not extend the runway at Port Stanley 
which would have allowed them to fly A-4 Skyhawks and French built Etendards aircraft 
from the islands and increase their aircrafts effectiveness, as opposed to flying long range 
from the mainland to attack British forces.261  
Another Argentinean assumption going into the conflict was that American 
interests would favor concessions by Britain. It expected the United States to convince 
the British not to divert forces away from the NATO Cold War effort.  Argentina also 
thought the U.S. would act as a neutral go-between to peacefully resolve the conflict. It 
was also hoped that U.S. neutrality would deny Britain the “use of strategic [and] 
intelligence facilities in the Atlantic.”262 These expectations about American neutrality 
were reinforced by the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Jeanne Kirkpatrick.  She had 
continually fought for U.S. neutrality in the conflict in order to maintain good relations 
with Central and South America.263 Argentina also expected American support, or at a 
minimum neutrality, in light of its commitments to the Monroe Doctrine and the Rio 
Pact.264 
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4. Strategic Indicators 
Thus far, this section discussed goals/ objectives, requirements, and assumptions 
necessary for planning and policy implementation; especially when deterrence and the 
use of credible threats are either a stated or implied goal to ward off conflict. But, these 
are not enough; one must have indicators for when policy or plans need to be reevaluated 
to verify the azimuth of the state and to make necessary course corrections to prevent 
being forced into decisions due to a lack of viable alternatives. Both Argentina and 
Britain did not have strategic indicators for policy review and corrections. This segment 
will use three indicators (of many) that would have been useful in requiring a 
reexamination of the situation, plan, and state of deterrence within the South Atlantic. 
These indicators are changes in internal/ domestic leadership and politics, changes in the 
geopolitical structure, and aggressive activities of any kind. All three of these indicators 
were present in connection with the Falkland Islands from 1970–1982.  
One major indicator for a reexamination of policy and plans is the change in 
domestic political sentiment or leadership. One reason for this is that if there is a political 
regime change and its “legitimacy and popularity are low…diversionary wars can be an 
effective means to attain popular support.”265 Paul states that “war initiation by a weaker 
state [is] greater when the power structure changes in that state; and when an insecure, 
militaristic group assumes control of the decision-making process.”266 Britain should 
have reexamined its South Atlantic policy (or lack of policy) when the Junta took over in 
December 1976.  Argentine aggressiveness was evident prior to the Junta, yet it was 
made worse after the Junta took over.  During the Junta’s tenure, South Thule Island had 
been occupied with the threat of naval reinforcement and attack upon South Georgia 
Island if Britain attempted to remove the Argentine personnel.  
The fact that, from 1976 on, Argentina was ruled by military governments was in 
itself a major reason for its going to war.  The Juntas were more authoritarian than any of 
their predecessors, and supported a “security first” policy in which they increased 
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spending on the Argentinean armed forces. When General Galtieri took over (1981), the 
Argentine economy was in shambles and under his regime, it worsened.267 By the same 
token, at the commencement of the Falkland Islands War (1982), the political situation in 
Britain was somber.  Britain suffered from a poor economy, declining perceptions of 
national self worth, unpopular political leadership, and numerous industrial disputes.268 
These conditions should have prompted Argentina to reassess its assumptions as well.  
When the Junta lost the dispute over the Beagle Islands and Channel to Chile, it 
worried about the effectiveness of its naval power in the South Atlantic. Having control 
of the Falkland Islands would have decreased Argentina’s tensions for two reasons. First, 
Argentinean control of the Falkland Islands would have given Argentina unrestricted and 
control of the South Atlantic. Second, control over the Falkland Islands would have 
destroyed the threat posed by a potential British-Chilean anti-Argentina relationship.269  
In 1975, the Argentine Foreign Minister told the British Ambassador to 
Argentina, David Ashe, that as a pre-condition for continued talks between the two states, 
Britain should turn a “blind eye” towards the dependencies and any potential occupation 
of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.  Ashe warned that if Argentina 
aggravated the situation, Britain would be forced to respond militarily to any attack on 
the island groups.270 It is important to note that this dialogue occurred prior to the 
occupation of South Thule Island in 1976 and under a different government with Britain. 
This conversation should have had a more permanent effect upon British assumptions and 
policy.  
The crisis over South Thule Island in 1976 and subsequent British lack of military 
action demonstrated to the Argentineans that Britain did not want a war in the South 
Atlantic.271 The British discovered an Argentine scientific military presence on South 
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Thule Island in December 1976 while retrieving survey equipment on the island.  The 
British party from HMS Endurance reported the incident to London on January 4, 1977.  
The FCO attempted to deal with the situation in a quiet unpublicized manner as they 
feared a backlash from the public knowledge of their inability to react to this Argentinean 
aggression.  It also wanted the South Thule occupation to be kept quiet as they wanted to 
proceed with negotiations over the sovereignty issue of the Falkland Islands. On January 
19, 1977, Britain formally protested the Argentinean presence on South Thule as a 
violation of British Sovereignty.272 But, no further action was taken.  
Other signals of Britain’s decreased interest in the region resulted from the 
decision to remove the HMS Endurance in 1982, the revocation of automatic British 
citizenship to the Falkland Islanders, and the proposal to close the British Antarctic 
Survey Base on South Georgia Island.273 These activities definitely made Argentina 
reassess its assumptions, which resulted in the decision to use force in reacquiring the 
islands.  
Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez gave a speech on 2 March 1982 in 
which he said that Argentina would settle the dispute to its own satisfaction because the 
negotiations had failed. The Argentine Naval Attaché reported that Mendez’ speech had 
alerted the British to Argentine military plans, when in fact it had not.274  The net result 
was that Argentina moved up its invasion plans by several months , while the British did 
nothing.  
After the RSS Shackleton incident, in February 1976, the Defence Operational 
Planning Staff released a report on military options to counter Argentine aggression. It 
stated that Argentina held the initiative in the region and could choose to escalate an 
incident anytime that it wanted. Due to several research vessels operating in the area and 
the necessary logistical life-support ships required to support the islands; Argentina could 
easily disrupt activities.  Given that sea resupply was the most efficient and capable 
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means of resupply, if Argentina laid siege to the islands, it would take a naval task force 
deployment of six weeks to deliver the necessary supplies to the islands.275 It is 
interesting to note that the British did not examine or attempt to increase the capabilities 
of the airfield on the Falkland Islands to support military aircraft, especially military 
aircraft capable of delivering logistical materials. Also, Britain did not take any measures 
to expand its options towards threatening Argentinean capabilities and interests within 
the region. In general, its outlook suggests a mixture of complacency towards Argentina, 
mingled with a desire to avoid any provocative action that might startle the Junta into 
taking some dramatic action that would force the issue. 
B. THE MILITARY 
Military planning needs to take into account threats posed by a potential 
opponent’s forces and weapons capabilities, as well as an opponent’s ability to conduct 
blitzkrieg, attrition, and/or limited warfare.  These plans need to address both the primary 
and secondary theaters of governmental interest as well as potential military contingency 
options in unanticipated conflicts. This section of the chapter will demonstrate how the 
British MoD and military failed to plan and maintain credible military options to include 
viable threats against an increasingly aggressive Argentina. The first part will discuss the 
status of Britain’s flexible deterrent options prior to 1976.  The second part will examine 
the status of Britain’s flexible deterrent options after 1976 and how it impacted the 
evolving conflict over the Falkland Islands. 
1. British Conventional Deterrence Options: Part I (1956–1976) 
The Suez Crisis of 1956 was a major turning point in British politics.  To briefly 
recap, the Suez Crisis occurred when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal.  In response to 
this action, Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt (without consulting the United 
States) with the intent of reversing Egypt’s actions. Since the United States had not been 
consulted in their plans, the United States refused to support them and all three states 
were forced to withdraw.  
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As a result of the Suez Crisis (1956), Britain began to build up its naval 
expeditionary capability in order to maintain the capability to conduct unilateral 
operations and protect British interests throughout the world. These capabilities included 
a large fleet of aircraft carriers capable of conducting airborne early warning, strike, 
fighter, and anti-submarine missions. However, in 1966, British policy reviews were 
conducted and it was decided that British conventional forces needed to be focused upon 
Western Europe. As a result of these reviews and decreased capabilities, the British 
overall military capabilities of force projection were focused upon the nuclear threat and 
anti-submarine warfare.276 As a result of these decisions, in the late 1960s, Britain began 
dissociating itself from global commitments by ridding itself of bases, air, and naval 
capabilities necessary for power projection outside of Europe.277  
Prior to 1974, Britain had a tiered system of conventional deterrence for the South 
Atlantic and Antarctica.  This system comprised of naval bases in Simonstown, South 
Africa (4,000 miles from the Falkland Islands), Bermuda (6,000 miles from the Falkland 
Islands), and the HMS Endurance, the permanent British presence in the South 
Atlantic.278 As a result of governmental policies enacted in the late 1960s, these 
deterrence features were allowed to atrophy; beginning with the closure of Simonstown 
in 1974, the closure of Bermuda in 1976, and the final attempt to scrap the HMS 
Endurace in 1981.279 The HMS Endurance had almost been sold or scrapped twice in its 
lifetime.  The first time came in 1975 defence review, when it was saved due to the RSS 
Shackleton incident and the work of the FCO to keep it as the lone symbol of British 
presence in the region.  The second time came in the 1981 defence review, but Lord 
Carrington (FCO) was unable to convince the MoD of the ships deterrent value in the 
region. Because the HMS Endurance did not have nor fit a NATO role, and was due for 
an expensive overhaul in 1982, it was decided to scrap the ship instead.280 
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In the face of blatant Argentinean antagonism, vehemence, and threats about 
recovering the Falkland Islands281; the military and Ministry of Defence  might well have 
played a pivotal role in creating options and viable counter threats for the British 
government.  Yet this did not occur.  As will be demonstrated in the next part, the 
military’s lack of planning and foresight did not give options to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) or the British government to counter increasingly 
Argentine aggressive moves. 
2. Britain’s Conventional Deterrent Options: Part II (1976–1982) 
By 1976, Britain’s flexible deterrent options were non-existent in the South 
Atlantic. The only symbol of British commitment to the region was the HMS Endurance, 
and this ship was constantly threatened with being withdrawn and scrapped. This 
segment will demonstrate how the lack of British military options and requisite planning 
outside of the European Theater directly contributed to Argentina’s perception that 
Britain would not respond military if Argentina used force to reacquire the islands.  
a. Balance of Forces/Parity 
As mentioned in chapter II, there are two contending theories of 
deterrence in regards to military balance of forces. One theory states that conventional 
deterrence will be maintained when opponents have the same capabilities resulting in the 
equal threat of destruction.  This portion of the chapter argues that the parity of forces 
between Britain and Argentina caused the breakdown of deterrence within the South 
Atlantic Region. The balance of forces narrowed between the two antagonists not only in 
the size of the British Navy and its decreased capability, but also in the weapon systems 
accrued by Argentina. This closeness in parity of forces decreased Britain’s credible 
threat of making Argentina’s costs for aggressive action higher than the benefits it would 
receive.  
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The British Chiefs of Staff determined that the type of military presence 
needed to deter aggression vis-à-vis the Falkland Islands would be “very expensive and 
would engage a significant portion of the country’s naval resources… [and] its dispatch 
could precipitate the very action it was intended to deter.”282 Thus, fear and risk entered 
into the military calculation of a political decision. The Chiefs of Staff also determined 
that “to get such a force to the South Atlantic in response to a military threat to the 
Islands would take at least twenty days and probably longer, given the need to assemble 
and prepare. If it arrived after the Islands had been occupied there could be no certainty 
that they could be retaken.”283  
The MoD determined that the defense of the Islands was not economically 
viable or practical; although, some consideration was given to how to recapture the 
islands if they were attacked. They had determined that it would take a brigade-sized task 
force to recapture the islands; however, Britain at the time was reducing its sealift 
capability as well. In 1975, the Chief of Naval Staff proposed moving and storing sea 
mines on the Falkland Islands in case of Argentinean aggression. The FCO vetoed this 
option as it was viewed as too provocative a move.284  
The 1981 Nott Defence Review in the British MoD made a big impression 
on the Argentineans. In 1981, Britain and the MoD were in the midst of an economic 
crunch. During 1979-81, the MoD had overspent its budget285, the conservative party had 
a deflationary policy that negatively affected the whole British economy, and the world 
was in a global recession.  It is against this backdrop that the Nott Defence Review  
occurred.286  The Nott Defence Review attempted to realistically match ends and means, 
yet it had catastrophic affects upon Britain’s interests in the South Atlantic vis-à-vis 
Argentina. 
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Nott’s defense review outlined four main roles for the British armed 
forces.  They included: 1) provide an independent strategic and theater nuclear force for 
the NATO alliance; 2) defend the United Kingdom; 3) provide a major land and air 
contribution to the defense of mainland Europe; 4) deploy a major maritime capability in 
the western Atlantic.287 This review focused on Britain’s military commitment to NATO, 
and only lip service to other regional commitments. It did plan on increasing the number 
of out-of-area cruises and exercises to the South Atlantic, Caribbean, Indian Ocean, and 
points further east.288 Yet, it did not address the requirements to fill “out-of-area” 
requirements affecting British interests.  
As a result of this review, the focus for the Royal Navy became solidified 
as anti-submarine warfare and keeping the lines of communication open in the Northern 
Atlantic. The Nott Defence Review planned on keeping two of four aircraft carriers.  The 
HMS Hermes would be sold as soon as the HMS Ark Royal (the fourth carrier) came on 
line and became operational.289 In an attempt to save surface ships, the Royal Navy 
recommended scrapping the HMS Endurance, HMS Britannia, LPDs (amphibious assault 
ships), and disbanding the Royal Marines. Nott decided to scrap the HMS Endurance 
(over the objections of the FCO), but he kept the Royal Marines and the royal yacht HMS 
Britannia.290 Although the Royal Marines were kept, the amphibious assault ships (HMS 
Intrepid and HMS Fearless) were not going to be replaced or maintained. Along with the 
decision to sell the HMS Hermes, Nott and the MoD signed an agreement with Australia 
to sell the HMS Invincible in February 1982.291 Both of these aircraft carriers were to 
partake in the Falkland Islands War. The net result of the Nott Defence Review was that 
the size and capabilities of the Royal Navy surface fleet were significantly reduced, with 
the carrier fleet reduced to one active and one in refit by the end of 1982.  
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The Junta had been actively building up the military since 1976.  By 1982, 
the Argentine military consisted of numerous advanced aircraft capable of air-to-air 
refueling, air combat, and anti-ship operations.  The Argentine Navy also had one aircraft 
carrier capable of land-based aircraft strike capability, an old pre-World War II heavy 
cruiser, several diesel submarine and numerous frigates.292 These capabilities were 
impressive but not enough to threaten a British attempt to reverse the Argentine invasion 
of the Falkland Islands. One must also take into consideration the weapons systems held 
by each opponent to better understand how close in parity of capabilities of the two states 
were. 
Paul claims that superior capabilities rested with the British; they had an 
all-volunteer force versus a conscription force, the British military expenses were six 
times higher than Argentina, Argentina’s military was heavily involved in internal 
security, and Britain had technical weapon superiority over Argentina. This was offset by 
Argentina’s tactical advantage of being closer to the theater of operations.293 The point 
about technical superiority is debatable, as Argentina did have numerous anti-ship 
missiles, numerous aircraft with refueling capabilities, the British lacked an airborne 
early warning system in theater, and it did not have carrier-based strike aircraft with 
capabilities equivalent to those of Argentina’s land-based fighters. The most obvious 
difference between the two sides was probably in the training and general professional 
level of the personnel involved, particularly among the ground forces. Once British forces 
were ashore on the Falklands, there was little chance that the Argentine garrison there 
would be able to expel them. 
Another Argentine weakness lay in its ASW capabilities. It did not have 
an effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability, which resulted in the Argentine 
Navy staying in home waters during the war. Following the sinking of the ARA General 
Belgrano, the Argentine Navy withdrew its only credible ASW platform, the aircraft 
carrier Veinticinquo de Mayo, which was rendered irrelevant for the rest of the war. 
Argentine submarine warfare capability against surface and subsurface ships was below 
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par as well.294 Argentina had numerous diesel submarines, yet they had not trained and 
were not proficient in anti-submarine missions. The Argentinean Air Force was also at a 
disadvantage despite Argentina’s relative proximity to the Falkland Islands. The islands 
were over 400 miles away from the mainland, close to the Argentine Air Force’s 
operational limits, even including air-to-air refueling. If the Argentineans had increased 
the size and capabilities of the airfield on the islands, this weakness might have been 
eliminated, assuming that the Argentines could have defended the fields effectively 
against British attack.  
b. Three Strategies of Warfare 
The Argentinean’s had three plans for the Falkland Islands, which were 
Alpha, Rosario, and Azul.  OPLAN Alpha concerned the reinforcement of South Georgia 
island. OPLAN Rosario involved the Argentine Navy solely taking over the Falkland 
Islands.  OPLAN Azul was the joint plan of all Argentine services attacking the Falkland 
Islands. Although the Argentineans had thoroughly planned the conquest of the islands, 
they did not plan Phase IV of their operation, defense against British reaction or what 
they were going to do once they had physically captured the island.295 Operation Azul’s 
purpose was to quickly attain a fait accompli takeover of the islands, then withdraw all 
forces forty-eight hours later leaving behind 500 marines and a military governor in order 
to maintain its credible claims of sovereignty over the islands and prevent a British 
reoccupation of the islands. The endstate of this operation was to force the British back to 
the negotiating table and settle the sovereignty issue in Argentina’s favor.296  
Argentina’s original plan called for the invasion of the Falkland Islands to 
occur between June and October; however due to the Davidoff expedition on South 
Georgia Island, the timetable had to be sped up.297 Although Argentina’s military 
capabilities were not at their maximum potential, the Junta decided upon the invasion 
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anyways because they did not expect a major military response and the final solution was 
expected to have been through further negotiations.298 Argentina also suffered from 
keeping its best military forces on the mainland to counter the Chilean threat and 
unsynchronized battle plans. The various military forces plans following the invasion 
were not synchronized, the overall air campaign was not coordinated and synchronized 
with Argentine Army defense requirements on the islands.299  
Huth noted that “a defending state needs the military capacity to respond 
quickly and in strength to a range of military contingencies, and thus be able to deny the 
attacker its military objectives at the outset or very early strategies of an armed 
offensive.”300 Britain was only prepared to fight a war of attrition in Europe.  It did not 
have any military plans or threat-inducing capability for out-of-area operations. Britain 
had systematically decreased its capabilities in the South Atlantic area from 1967 to 
1982. Nott Defense Review solidified Britain’s decreased capabilities along the lines 
prescribed by its commitment to NATO. In the process, it also demonstrated that Britain 
did not have a credible threat against a potential Argentinean aggression.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Britain was unable to politically and militarily deter Argentine aggressiveness 
because it had an ambiguous stance towards the South Atlantic Region, which prevented 
effective planning and leveraging of credible threats to protect its interests. War broke out 
between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands for two additional reasons. The 
first is that Britain did not believe Argentine threats to reacquire the islands by force if 
necessary. This resulted in unresponsive and unclear policy. The second reason is that 
Argentina believed that Britain would accept a military takeover of the islands. This led 
the disgruntled Argentineans to believe that they could settle this dispute by force since 
negotiations were not going anywhere.301 Patrick Morgan claims that “a severe conflict 
                                                 
298  Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers, 157. 
299 Ibid., 153. 
300 Paul K. Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical 
Debates," Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999), 30. 
301 Jervis, Lebow and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 89. 
 66
presumably makes parties more willing to fight; it alters their preferences to make their 
level of unacceptable damage higher so it takes more to deter them. A severe conflict 
expands the parties’ emotional intensity, making rational calculation less likely or 
appealing.”302  A sense of “severe conflict” certainly seems to have existed in the minds 
of Argentina’s leadership from 1976-1982. No similar sense of severity seems to have 
existed in London until the onset of war itself, however. The political atmosphere in 
Argentina, in which successive military Juntas legitimized themselves chiefly with 
reference to the prestige (and repressive power) of the armed forces, severely restricted 
Argentina’s face-saving options when it discovered that Britain would fight to maintain 
sovereignty over the disputed islands. Their planning process took into account the best 
case scenarios, without considering how events might unfold if their assumptions turned 
out to be incorrect.  
On the British side, the cumulative effect of the unsynchronized and shifting 
defense priorities, dominated by the need to sustain Britain’s role in NATO, severely 
limited the options available to Britain in response Argentinean aggressive acts. Thus, 
Britain’s failure to plan a coherent deterrence policy forced it take a risky military 
venture that had severe political consequences both at home and abroad. In the end, 
conventional deterrence based upon an unambiguous threat of military force was not 
attempted by Britain until March 29, 1982 when it ordered a submarine with support 
vessels to the South Atlantic.303 This action was already too late, as the correct time for 
conventional deterrence had already come and gone.  
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V. PSYCHOLOGY, CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE, AND THE 
FALKLAND ISLANDS 
To many men much-wandering hope comes as a boon, but to many others 
it is the deception of vain desires. 
Sophocles, Antigone304 
In addition to the politico-military aspects of deterrence, one must consider the 
psychological aspects of conventional deterrence failure and their contribution to the 
onset of the Falkland Islands War. One of the central tenets of conventional deterrence is 
that international actors behave and act in a rational manner. The role of perception is 
equally critical. Both rationality and perception impact the issuance and reception of 
signals meant to deter certain actions from occurring. These and other related 
psychological components are important determinants of the success or failure of 
conventional deterrence. This chapter argues that psychological factors based upon the 
rational actor model prevented Britain from formulating a coherent policy and military 
posture that could threaten Argentina from taking unwanted actions.  
A. RATIONALITY 
Britain’s conduct in the years preceding the Falklands war was undoubtedly 
rational, within any common-sense meaning of that word. Yet that does not refute the fact 
that Britain had conflicting goals or desired outcomes throughout the entire history of the 
conflict.  One goal was to come to a negotiated settlement with Argentina over the 
sovereignty issue of the Falkland Islands.  The other was to ensure the self-determination 
of the Falkland Islanders and their right to choose the government under which they 
wanted to live. A third goal (post invasion) was to not let naked armed aggression go 
unpunished. The Falkland Islands became an important issue in 1960 and 1965 when 
Argentina successfully lobbied the UN General Assembly to get the Falkland Islands 
listed as a global decolonization issue.  The Assembly passed Resolutions 1514 and 
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2065305 specifically calling on both Britain and Argentina to come to a negotiated 
settlement over the Falklands Islands regardless of the will or needs to the islands 
population. For the British, the issue of sovereignty surrounding the islands was 
inextricably linked to the concept of self-determination of a people and the international 
community trying to force the abandonment of a people under the guise of 
decolonization.306 The UNGA Resolutions and international pressure are what set the 
two states on a conflictual collision course that would eventually lead to war.  
Given these two conflictual goals and values, Britain began pursuing courses of 
action that attempted to bring the Falkland Islanders closer to understanding, and 
potentially accepting, future Argentine sovereignty.  This last issue is particularly 
important, as the Falkland Islanders were British citizens. In moving towards these goals, 
Britain signed numerous logistical agreements with Argentina to render medical, 
educational, and other support to the islands.  Britain even attempted to ignore numerous 
Argentine aggressive actions in order to maintain and keep negotiations open, because it 
viewed negotiations as a means for weaning both the Argentineans and the islanders off 
of their extreme positions in a type of “educational exercise.”307 In this effort, they 
believed they could successfully resolve the conflict between the two states. Yet, at no 
point did Britain express that it would protect the islanders interests with military action 
if necessary. 
Argentina also pursued its goal of reacquiring lost territory from the British in a 
rational manner.  Their aim was always the same: to regain sovereignty over the Falkland 
Islands and the subsidiary islands and maintain regional hegemony over the South 
Atlantic.  The Argentineans pursued multiple courses of action in order to attain this goal.  
As mentioned earlier, it had successfully lobbied around the world to have the Falkland 
Islands situation labeled as a decolonization issue despite the fact that the islanders were 
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British citizens. It sought to test British resolve by slowly escalating the conflict, 
beginning with the RSS Shackleton incident. The Argentine Navy fired upon the RSS 
Shackleton, a British research ship, while it was attempting to determine the economic 
potential of the region in terms of resource exploitation.308  This was followed by the 
occupation of South Thule Island in December 1976.309 It was during this time period 
that Argentina’s navy began chasing Bulgarian and Russian fishing trawlers out of 
disputed waters in overt demonstrations that supported its claim to sovereignty within the 
region and disputed territories.310 Subsequent to these actions, Argentina had planned to 
take over another South Sandwich Island when Britain returned to the negotiations table 
in 1977.311 From 1977 until 1981, Argentina pursued a policy of negotiation as it 
believed that was the most effective means to rationally attain its goal of reacquiring the 
Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).   Once this process had failed, Argentina decided to 
pursue other courses of action to include the use of force in recovering the islands. When 
Davidoff and his party landed on South Georgia Island in 1982 and refused to comply 
with British regulations about ports of entry, the Argentine Junta believed the time was 
ripe for taking the military action that it had planned for later in the year.  
B. PERCEPTION AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: BRITAIN AND 
ARGENTINA 
The rational actor model is helpful in understanding British and Argentinean 
actions that led to conventional deterrence failure. Yet, it is not a sufficient explanation 
for why Britain was unable to create credible threats to counter act Argentine aggression. 
Nor does it explain why, when it became apparent that Britain was willing to go to war 
over the Falkland Islands, Argentina did not back down in “mea culpa” fashion. This 
section of the chapter argues that these two rational actors (Britain and Argentina) had 
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radically different perceptions of the conflict, arising in part from various forms of 
cognitive dissonance about what was really going on.  
1. Perceptions 
Britain had significantly different perceptions of the Falkland Islands Conflict 
from those of Argentine. They believed that negotiations were actually discussions to 
bring the islanders and Argentina closer together, and shift them away from their 
extremist viewpoints312; They also believed that Argentina would not attack the Falkland 
Islands outright without a highly visible military buildup. This first perception was 
shaped by two biases. Britain wanted to be a leader within the international community 
and adhere to its dictates (the UN resolutions), while protecting the islander’s rights to 
self-determination (a basic tenet of the UN Charter). These biases increased the 
government’s cognitive dissonance as events progressed in unexpected ways.  
Britain’s need to protect the islands was inherently difficult to reconcile with its 
obviously limited practical means of doing so, at least in the short run. This seems to 
have contributed to the (unduly reassuring) assumption that any Argentine attack would 
be preceded by a visible military buildup. Britain’s logistical lines to the Falkland Islands 
were over 8,000 miles long. It needed to believe that Argentina would need to time to 
assemble naval and army occupation units. This preparation time was supposed to give 
Britain time to develop a course of action that it had failed to develop at its leisure during 
the long years leading up to the final crisis.  
Britain’s assumption, that a snap decision by Argentina to seize the islands was 
impossible, meant that during the crisis month of March 1982 it was primarily concerned 
about a miscalculated escalation that would lead to war.  Its hesitancy and apparent lack 
of resolve merely strengthened the Junta’s belief that Britain had neither the capability 
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demonstrated when the HMS Endurance did not forcibly remove the Argentineans from 
South Georgia Island in 1982 , at which point the British government effectively ceded 
the initiative to the Argentineans.313  
Argentina’s perception that Britain would not militarily respond to its occupation 
of the Falkland Islands resulted from a complex interaction of motivated and unmotivated 
biases. These are best summed up by two of Christopher Mitchell’s four models of 
ripeness for conflict resolution: “the Hurting Stalemate (HS),” and the “Entrapment 
model (ENT).”314 The HS model describes conditions in which “no party can envision a 
successful outcome through continuing current strategies, nor an end to increasingly 
unbearable costs.”315 The ENT model describes conditions under which “leaders become 
trapped into a continued pursuit of ‘victory’, even after the costs seem…to be 
‘unbearable.’ Underlying this second model is an apparently irrational process by which 
‘costs’ become transferred into ‘investments’ in a conflict that cannot be given up for 
anything less than complete victory.”316 Argentina believed itself to have been caught in 
one version or another of these two scenarios since 1833. 
2. Cognitive Dissonance 
Cognitive dissonance also played a role in the Falkland Islands conflict. Griffin 
defines cognitive dissonance as “the distressing mental state in which people ‘find 
themselves doing things that don’t fit with what they know, or having opinions that do 
not fit with other opinions they hold.’”317 British policy and actions suffered from this 
phenomenon. Britain refused to consider the sovereignty issue over the Falkland Islands 
before 1960 and barely acknowledged the UN resolutions about the Falklands until the 
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early 1970s. One of the Britain’s primary reasons for at least examining the sovereignty 
issue was that logistical resupply of the island had become more expensive. Britain 
wanted to shift the economic burden of the islands onto the Argentine government, 
maintain sovereignty over the islands, and still appear to be in compliance with the 
various UN resolutions. However, this attempt at burden shifting sent the British onto the 
path of cognitive dissonance. The Argentineans perceived that the British were finally 
willing to discuss handing over sovereignty of the islands to Argentina, when the political 
realities within Britain would not accept this. The British kept the Falkland Islands 
because its citizens were British and refused to be anything else.318 As time progressed, 
Britain became unwilling to unilaterally muster resources to support the islands without 
Argentina, and simultaneously unwilling to tell the islanders that they were going to have 
to accept Argentine sovereignty over the islands.319 Thus, Britain built its own quagmire 
by giving the Argentineans hope about recovering the lost islands when it was unwilling 
and incapable of doing so.  These inherent contradictions within the situation grew 
progressively worse as Argentine impatience and hostility increased  
Argentine cognitive dissonance stemmed from colonial disputes between Britain 
and Spain over the ownership of the islands.  When Argentina gained independence, it 
maintained Spain’s claims over the islands despite British possession of them. Its 
successive governments imagined that this remote and morally irrelevant historical 
circumstance constituted some kind of “legal” right to rule a place whose inhabitants 
were in fact the subjects of another country. The Argentineans did not understand the 
depth of the islander’s nationalism towards Britain, nor the international implications of 
its demands upon the British and its effects upon other British territories. Once going 
down this path, however, it was difficult to turn back . Each successive government from 
1960 onward had made the recovery of the islands a national topic. By 1982, the Falkland 
Islands were as much a part of Argentine national identity320 as Alsace-Lorraine was to 
the French, despite the fact that virtually no one from Argentina had ever been there.  
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By 1982, two very different cognitive contexts were at play in the Falkland 
Islands conflict.  The Argentineans viewed the British occupation as an intolerable 
national insult. The British on the other hand did not view that Falkland Islands as a 
decolonization issue at all, since  the citizens on the islands were incontestably British. 
Any use of force against the island would accordingly be an act of aggression, not 
national liberation.321  
a. Defensive Avoidance  
Both states suffered from defensive avoidance, which occurs when a 
policy maker searches for options other than the current course of action, and cannot find 
any. This results in psychological stress and the subsequent abandonment of hope for 
finding a better strategy, which leads to the avoidance of “fear arousing warnings.”322 
There are “three forms of defensive avoidance: 1) procrastination; 2) shifting 
responsibility for the decision; 3) bolstering.”323 Bolstering is when a policy maker 
commits himself to the least objectionable alternative and proceeds to exaggerate its 
positive consequences and minimize its negative ones.”324 Bolstering is dangerous 
because it allows the decision maker to ignore the negative consequences of his decision 
and actions. Two significant conditions must exist for defensive avoidance to play a 
major role in conflict management. The first is that “a state of relatively high decisional 
conflict resulting from two clashing types of threat that make easy resolution impossible. 
[The second is] the loss of hope finding a better solution than the defective ones already 
considered.”325 
This was the case for Britain in 1982. Because of the difficulty in 
accomplishing the British policy towards a negotiated settlement with Argentina over the 
Falkland Islands and the need to protect the Falkland Islanders desire for self-
determination, the Thatcher government sought to avoid any decision on the conflict 
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altogether.326 This decisional handicap was reinforced by the Falkland Islands lobby and 
its influence within the British government. The islanders’ lobby made it almost 
impossible to put pressure on them to accept Argentinean sovereignty or move back to 
England.327 The British government was thus unwilling and unable to force the islanders 
to accept Argentinean sovereignty, and also to tell the Argentinean government that the 
issue of sovereignty was no longer negotiable. The latter decision would have forced the 
British government to garrison a significant force on the islands to deter Argentina from 
trying to forcefully occupy it.328 Lebow succinctly states the quagmire in which Britain 
found itself:  
The British sense of helplessness in the South Atlantic seems to have 
elicited all three forms of defensive avoidance. The overall British policy 
objective of keeping negotiations alive was in effect a form of 
procrastination designed to postpone the need to make a choice between 
the Scylla of islander interests and the Charybdis of Argentine 
nationalism. It can also be seen as an attempt by the Thatcher government 
to avoid altogether the responsibility for such a decision by passing it on 
to their successors.  Finally, the government and intelligence community 
engaged in Bolstering. They convinced themselves that the course of 
action to which they were committed would succeed and became 
insensitive to information that indicated otherwise.329  
The Junta also suffered from severe defensive avoidance.  From 1976 
onward, they had executed a policy of terror at home and aggressive military expansion 
that had destroyed the economy and their base of support.  One of the few issues in which 
they appeared strong and had public support was the idea of recovering the Falkland 
Islands.  This issue had become a national obsession and the Junta portrayed themselves 
as the ones who would accomplish this task.330 By early 1982, the Junta had put 
themselves into a position from which they could not voluntarily back down. Britain 
might have helped them, had it assembled  a naval armada of sufficient magnitude to alter 
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the cost/ benefit calculus on the Argentine side, but it had no wish to do so lest it 
inadvertently provoke a violent response. The size and strength of a large naval armada 
might have given the Argentine leadership sufficient excuse to back down and save 
face.331 One way in which deterrence succeeds is by giving the other side an acceptable 
reason to show passivity without losing face.  
As part of defensive avoidance, the Junta failed to recognize and ignored 
information that demonstrated they were dealing with a state that was insensitive to its 
internal needs and dilemmas. The British government was oblivious to the storms 
brewing in Argentina and the despair accumulating within the Argentine Junta over 
domestic unrest. Thus, the Junta also displayed defensive avoidance in that it did not 
want to be overthrown by its own people. Yet, even after the invasion and the British 
response to it, it concluded that the situation had progressed too far for it to back down 
and survive.332 
b. Selective Exposure 
As a result of the worsening effects of defensive avoidance, both states 
began a campaign of selective exposure to certain types of information. Both states 
tended to discount or “avoid information that [was] likely to increase [their] 
dissonance.”333 This led them to discount information that contradicted their situational 
assumptions and only accept information that reinforced them.  In 1982, Britain’s 
cognitive dissonance was so severe that it appeared to require positive proof of 
Argentinean intent to take action prior to considering any potential threats as serious.334 
This is despite the fact that Britain had cracked the Argentinean diplomatic code in 1979. 
335 The subsequent degradation of relations should have alerted Britain to the possibility 
of an Argentine attack.  
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C. SIGNALS 
Signals are a very important component of conventional deterrence. If a state can 
give clear signals of its intentions and threats, deterrence is likely to be maintained. 
Nevertheless, even clear signals are liable to be interpreted in ways other than those 
intended by the sender. 
Prior to the Falklands War, British governments had little interest in the islands. 
As a result of this limited interest, the British never sent clear signals about its intentions 
to maintain the islands and Britain did not detail nor plan for forces to protect the Islands 
in time of crisis. The British government was, if anything, too willing to discuss the 
sovereignty issue.336 The removal of the HMS Endurance from the South Atlantic took 
away Britain’s last remaining presence in the region; and the perceived trip wire for 
conflict, from Argentina’s perspective, was therefore withdrawn. The revocation of 
automatic British citizenship to the Falkland Islanders also signaled a shift from that of 
direct deterrence (protection of native soil) to extended deterrence (protection of a third 
party.) Extended deterrence is much more difficult sustain. Finally, with British proposed 
plans to close the British Antarctic Survey Base on South Georgia Island, 337 Argentina 
perceived that Britain was disengaging from the region as a whole. 
In 1982, there were many signals of Argentine intentions to reacquire the 
Falkland Islands by force. Throughout the month of March, the Argentine Junta explicitly 
stated that it would not rule out any options for regaining the islands.  Additionally, 
Argentine diplomats began dropping hints that if the British did not return to the 
negotiating table with the intent to cede sovereignty over the islands, the military might 
be used to get what the negotiations could not. And, finally, the Argentine government 
gave full protection to the Argentine “squatters” on South Georgia Island by sending 
three warships to ward off the HMS Endurance.338 After signals intelligence came 
through the MoD regarding an impending Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands, on 
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31 March 1982, Admiral Leach told the Prime Minister that he could get the British 
carriers at sea within forty-eight hours and have them link up with the bulk of the fleet 
operating off of Gibraltar.339 The British leadership had hoped that this clear signal of 
intentions and overt threat of military response would prevent the Argentineans from 
invading the island.  However, the British reaction was too little, too late. The Junta 
needed the recovery of the islands to bolster domestic support and after the invasion, all 
of Argentina rejoiced about recovering the islands. Even with the British Fleet moving to 
the South Atlantic, it was not a sufficiently threatening signal of intent because the 
British military capabilities needed to recapture the islands were thought to be of 
questionable effectiveness.  
D. FEAR 
Fear is a critical element of conventional deterrence. From 1976 to 1982, Britain 
had consistently failed to instill fear in Argentina.  In fact, it was Argentina who instilled 
fear in Britain and successfully deterred Britain from taking actions contrary to Argentine 
interests. From 1976 onward, one of Argentina’s greatest fears was that Britain would 
turn to Chile as an ally and potential source of logistical support for the Falkland Islands. 
Chile had an ongoing dispute with Argentina over the Beagle Islands and the control of 
the Beagle Channel. Given Chilean control over the Beagle Islands, Argentina feared that 
Chile in turn might aid the British in providing logistical support to the Falkland Islands, 
which would decrease Argentina’s influence within the region and make reacquiring the 
islands even more difficult.340 After the very serious incidents in 1976, Britain could 
have developed closer relations to Chile to heighten Argentine fears of unacceptable 
losses  and deter further attempts at aggression within the South Atlantic Region. This 
type of action had the added advantage of forcing the Argentineans to accept negotiations 
as a form of dialogue between the islanders and the Argentine government with the goal 
of increasing mutual understanding and trust between the two parties. This mutual trust 
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could have led to Argentina peaceably reacquiring the Falkland Islands while allaying the 
islander’s fears about being thrown into the grip of a dictatorship. 
In spite of Argentine fears about losing influence within the region, Argentina 
successfully instilled the fear of unacceptable losses within Britain until 1982. From 1976 
to 1982, Britain was afraid of having to commit more resources to protecting the Falkland 
Islands. Until 1980, it was politically and militarily less expensive for Britain to negotiate 
with Argentina.  Argentina understood this and routinely threatened to stop logistical 
support to the islands when Britain began to vacillate on the negotiations. Argentina also 
understood the British fear of having to garrison a large military force in the South 
Atlantic to protect its interests. Argentine military actions were designed to force the 
British back to the negotiations table or expend a lot of money and effort to maintain the 
islands, which Britain was not prepared to do. In 1982, Argentina began aggressive 
activities to force the British back to the negotiating table because this tactic had always 
worked in the past.  
Long wrote, “if an opponent believes that taking an action that one wishes to deter 
will set in motion events that may escalate beyond the control of both parties, then 
uncertainty will make him less likely to take an action.”341 Argentina successfully 
applied this principle against Britain until the spring of 1982. Britain’s fears resulted in 
their own deterrence because their fears went beyond the evidence of significant 
destruction.342 Britain feared having to resume logistical support and local defense of the 
islands.  Their fear allowed subsidiary island occupations, shots fired against British 
research vessels, and so forth, to go unanswered. Their continued willingness to negotiate 
over sovereignty simultaneously increased Falkland Islander fears of being pushed into 
the hands of an oppressive regime.343  
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E. RISK 
Although people try to assess risk rationally, the actual decision to take a risk has 
other psychological dimensions as well. Long points out that “humans as a rule tend to be 
risk acceptant when facing loss and risk averse toward gain.”344 Two important points 
about risk need to be reemphasized: 1) It is a function of the capabilities of the attacker 
and defender; 2) it is also a function of the relationship between the military and political 
implications of going to war.345 By 1982, the Argentine Junta faced losing its power 
through domestic troubles and the odds of regaining sovereignty over the Falkland 
Islands were decreasing. Britain, on the other hand, perceived its risk as no more than that 
of having to reassume logistical and military support to the islands. 
1. Attacker/Defender Capabilities 
The respective capabilities of both Britain and Argentina were very important in 
determining what level of risk each state was willing to accept within the conflict. In the 
late 1970s, the British Chiefs of Staff determined that the type of military presence 
needed to deter aggression vis-à-vis the Falkland Islands would be “very expensive and 
would engage a significant portion of the country’s naval resources… [and] its dispatch 
could precipitate the very action it was intended to deter.”346 Britain was also not willing 
to risk antagonizing Argentina and being forced to resume full logistical support for the 
Falkland Islands. However, the nature of risk in the conflict significantly changed for the 
British in March 1982. Although British capabilities in the region were non-existent prior 
to the invasion, the Thatcher government faced a very significant risk of losing power if it 
did not respond to the Argentine invasion.  In trying to reoccupy the islands with an ad 
hoc force that was not designed for expeditionary warfare, Britain risked losing a war to a 
third world regional power, further decreasing its already poor self image, and  putting 
the future of the Thatcher government in jeopardy.  
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In late 1981 and early 1982, the Argentine Junta believed that the risk of 
forcefully occupying the Falkland Islands was low.  The Nott Defence Review (1981) 
had significantly reduced Britain’s global capabilities and refocused its efforts upon 
European commitments.  Additionally, Britain’s perceived commitment to the region 
decreased due to the nullification of automatic citizenship to the Falkland Islanders, the 
removal of HMS Endurance, and the proposed closure of the British research station on 
South Georgia Island. Also, Argentina significantly built up its military capabilities so 
that it could fight a war of attrition until the international community became involved to 
end the conflict. Fighting a war of attrition was presumed to favor Argentina due to the 
relative proximity of the Islands and long logistics lines for Britain to maintain. 
2. Political Implications of War 
There were significant political risks for both Britain and Argentina in going to 
war. For Britain, if the Thatcher government had not gone to war, it would have fallen. 
Therefore, the “long-shot” option of a naval fight was viewed as necessary to maintain its 
power. The military risk was certain; however, Prime Minister Thatcher took numerous 
steps to reduce the political risks of going to war. The Suez Crisis of 1956 was very 
important for the British because it taught them four important lessons that Thatcher 
applied during the Falklands Crisis. These four lessons were: “1) We should not get into a 
military operation unless we were determined and able to finish it; 2) We should never 
again find ourselves on the opposite side to the United States in a major international 
crisis affecting Britain’s interests; 3) We should ensure that our actions were in accord 
with international law; 4) He who hesitates is lost.”347  
Britain’s decision to fight forced them to take into account the dearth of logistics 
facilities between Britain and the Falkland Islands, Argentine weapons systems and their 
capabilities, and whether or not other states would abide by agreed upon sanctions against 
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Argentina.348 Thus, throughout March and April of 1982, the British government actively 
sought international and U.S. support condemning Argentina’s aggression against the 
Falkland Islands. Not only did the U.S. not remain neutral in the conflict, it actively 
supported the British with weapons and logistics.  Also, the United Nations Security 
Council voted two resolutions condemning Argentina’s naked aggression and supporting 
Britain’s attempt to reverse Argentina’s activities.  Thus, through Britain’s hard work, the 
political risk was ultimately managed very effectively in Britain’s favor. Both of the 
governments that went to war over the Falklands believed that their own political future 
was at stake in the conflict. It was the British, in the end, who were able to insure more 
effectively against this risk.  
Nevertheless, it remains true that Britain was unable to formulate a coherent 
policy capable of deterring Argentine aggression in the South Atlantic. As Lawrence 
Freedman said, “the most striking feature of British policy… was the decision to make it 
more difficult to cope with a confrontation should one arise, and to do so in a highly 
visible manner.”349 Britain’s ambivalence and passivity were reinforced by political and 
economic conditions that seemed to limit its options even further,  and strengthened the 
Argentine perception that they in fact had the upper hand.350 This perceptual distortion  
on the Argentinean side ultimately caused them to go to war. The apparent “lack of 
British resolve, the difficulty of recapturing the Falklands, expectations of U.S. neutrality, 
and differing cognitive conceptions of the controversy, were rationalizations for a policy 
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VI. CREDIBILITY AND REPUTATION  
Words are but the shadows of actions. 
Democritus352 
Up until now, the discussion on the Falkland Islands War (1982) has primarily 
focused upon the political, military, and psychological aspects of conventional 
deterrence. These three elements are critical ingredients to the success or failure of 
conventional deterrence because their combination impacts a state’s behavior and has a 
direct impact upon the credibility of threats to instill a fear of unacceptable losses. To 
reiterate, Daryl Press claimed the following points about credibility: “1) it is a perception; 
2) it is not tangible; 3) credibility of a threat is not synonymous with seriousness of a 
threat. The seriousness surrounding a threat is directly related to the cost of the threat.”353 
Thus, the essence of a credible threat is that it must be believed.354 
This chapter will cover the concepts of credibility and reputation within 
conventional deterrence. It argues that Britain’s unclear policy and military capabilities 
created doubt within Argentina about Britain’s ability to threaten, thwart, and deter its 
plans for taking over the islands. This will be explained through four related ideas: 1) 
central/ extended deterrence; 2) immediate/ general deterrence; 3) denial and punishment; 
4) reputation. 
A. CENTRAL (BASIC)/EXTENDED DETERRENCE 
The credibility of central (basic) and extended deterrence is important because of 
its direct impact upon the credibility of British threats. Basic deterrence protects the state 
and its territory, whereas extended deterrence protects a third party’s territory or interests. 
In the early 1970s, Britain treated the Falklands as an extended deterrence issue. 
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Extended deterrence and threats associated with it are the most difficult to make credible 
due to a perceived view of the object not being a core value to the deterrer.  
From 1976 to 1982, British actions undermined the credibility of its commitment 
by ignoring Argentine aggression, as demonstrated by: 1) Britain’s failure to forcefully 
react to Argentine warships firing upon the RSS Shackleton; 2) acceptance of Argentine 
hostile fire upon Russian and Bulgarian fishing trawlers; 3) Britain’s failure to forcefully 
expel Argentine occupation forces on South Thule Island. Even Britain’s lone attempt at 
“conventional deterrence” (1977) did not have a significant effect because the British 
kept their naval movements a secret for fear of aggravating the Argentineans. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, deterrence signals must be overt and to the point, and 
Britain’s feeble attempt did not satisfy this requirement. Additionally, after negotiations 
broke down; Britain did not reinforce the islands defenses nor did it increase the number 
of naval cruises in the area to symbolize at a minimum its position of extended 
deterrence. 
B. IMMEDIATE/GENERAL DETERRENCE 
To briefly review, immediate deterrence is when there is an active consideration 
of attack by the deteree and general deterrence is when the possibility of attack exists.355 
Until 1976, Argentina did not pose a significant military threat to the Falkland Islands. 
Britain still had its tiered system of deterrence that encapsulated the South Atlantic and 
the Royal Navy was of sufficient size to credibly threaten the lower-grade Argentine 
Navy. Thus, the claim can be made that Argentina was generally deterred. 
A turning point in British-Argentinean relations came in 1976.. Beginning with 
the attack on the RSS Shackleton, Britain needed to reassess its deterrence focus in the 
South Atlantic Ocean in light of these overt hostilities. With the attack on the RSS 
Shackleton, Argentina had signaled its intent to reassert its sovereignty by force within 
the region and over the disputed territories.  These actions were followed up by attacks on 
foreign fishing trawlers and the occupation of South Thule Island. Although the Falkland 
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Islands’ security was not threatened, British sovereign rights in the region were, and this 
warranted a more robust deterrence posture to protect British interests against Argentina. 
Whether or not the general deterrence took the form of central or extended deterrence is 
immaterial when the initial policy or military steps are not even taken. In fact, Britain’s 
general deterrence position became close to non-existent with the closure of Britain’s 
Bermuda naval base in 1976.  
Another decision point year was 1981 when Britain needed to reexamine its 
conventional deterrence posture within the South Atlantic.  In 1980, the lease back option 
had failed and Britain did not increase any regional conventional deterrence features to 
once again signal that the Falklands Islands were once more a central deterrence issue to 
Britain. Four major events in 1981 changed the situation of general deterrence to 
immediate deterrence: 1) the Falkland Islanders losing their automatic British citizenship; 
2) the Nott Defence Review and prioritization of forces on Europe with minimal mention 
of British protectorates; 3) the planned decommissioning of the HMS Endurance 
(tripwire, British regional commitment, and deterrent); 4) the Galtieri Junta in Argentina.  
By March 1982, Britain was beyond enacting immediate conventional deterrence, 
the situation had transitioned to compellance. Compellance is different from deterrence 
because a threat is applied to the opponent until it acts and ceases the undesired 
activity.356 The situation in the South Atlantic had deteriorated to the point where 
conventional deterrence was no longer viable. The Davidoff Incident was the proverbial 
“line in the sand” in which Argentina could no longer be deterred from taking aggressive 
actions against British interests, it had to be compelled to stop.  
C. DENIAL/PUNISHMENT 
Britain’s ability to deny Argentina its objectives and punish it for its attempts was 
in question during 1982. This led the Argentineans to believe they were near-peer 
regional competitors with Britain and that they had the local military superiority to fight  
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and win a swiftly executed campaign against the Falkland Islands before the British could 
react. Numerous other important states in the international system believed in Britain’s 
decreased capability as well.  
The ability to deny an opponent a quick fait accompli is an important cornerstone 
to conventional deterrence. After Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal and Britain’s 
inability to unilaterally deny and punish Egypt for its actions, Britain set about rebuilding 
its military infrastructure.357 Its military and naval capability peaked in 1966, a year after 
UN General Assembly resolution 2065 was passed calling upon Britain to negotiate the 
issue of the Falkland Islands. Britain’s deference to the UN became the first step in its 
inability to deny Argentina its objective of retrieving the Falkland Islands. The next step 
was a slow but sure decrease in military expeditionary capability that culminated with 
Nott’s Defence Review in 1981.  
The RSS Shackleton (1976) incident demonstrated Britain’s inability to deny or 
even threaten to deny Argentine activities in the South Atlantic Ocean. As a result, 
Britain was forced to garrison Royal Marines on the Falkland Islands as a measure of 
minimal deterrence.358 In reality, the Royal Marines became a trip wire event as their 
numbers with limited naval capability in the region were insufficient to force the 
Argentineans off of South Thule Island in 1976-77 and off of South Georgia Island in 
1982.  
The British military recognized its growing inability to deny Argentinean 
objectives in the late 1970s and the increasing difficulty of punishing Argentina for future 
acts of aggression. In 1977, the British Chiefs of Staff determined that the type of 
military presence needed to deter Argentine aggression would be prohibitively expensive 
and would require naval resources that were needed for the defense of Europe.359 As this 
last option was ruled out, they also questioned their ability to punish Argentina should 
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they attack the Falkland Islands. It was determined that “to get such a force to the South 
Atlantic…would take at least twenty days and probably longer, given the need to 
assemble and prepare. If it arrived after the Islands had been occupied there could be no 
certainty that they could be retaken.”360 
One alternative that would have threatened Argentina by denying them their 
objectives while instilling significant fear was a potential liaison between Chile and 
Britain. A closer relationship between Britain and Chile would have created an effective 
threat to deny and punish Argentina over its aggressive activities in the South Atlantic 
Ocean. Yet, this type of action was not taken because of British fears about having to 
resume logistical support for the islands. 
The Nott Defence Review made a huge impression upon Argentina and its 
perceptions of Britain’s ability to deny and punish aggressive activity against the 
Falkland Islands. Despite Britain’s amount of defense spending, its all volunteer force, 
and extensive military weaponry; it had some severe disadvantages as well. Britain’s 
logistical supply lines were over 8,000 miles distant and it also did not have any 
conventional aircraft carriers equipped with land-based aircraft capabilities of AEW and 
ground attack. This last capability would have significantly changed Argentina’s 
perception of Britain’s ability to punish it.361  
Argentina also had weakness in its war-fighting capability.  The distance of the 
Falkland Islands to the Argentinean mainland required significant air-to-air refueling for 
strike aircraft.  Having failed to extend the runway, the Argentine Air Force had very 
little linger time over their objectives reducing their overall effectiveness.362 The other 
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weakness was the lack of Argentine ASW capability.363 As the Nott Defence Review 
reinforced, anti-submarine warfare was the Royal Navy’s contribution to NATO.364  
Thus, Britain could effectively deny Argentine naval movements (both surface and 
submarine) throughout the South Atlantic Ocean during time of war. In fact during the 
execution of the war, British forces successfully denied Argentina the use of its navy (to 
include the Argentinean conventional aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinquo de Mayo) by 
sinking the heavy cruiser ARA General Belgrano. This action both demonstrated British 
denial and punishment against Argentine naval activity and Argentina’s inability to 
counter the British threat. 
In trying to resolve the Argentinean use of force, Britain no longer had the denial 
option; but, it could punish (or at least attempt to) the Argentine decision to invade the 
Falkland Islands. A decision had to be made on how badly to punish Argentina and 
whether or not to give them any face-saving options. Prime Minister Thatcher decided 
against giving Argentina any face-saving options.365 This punishment came in the form 
of a naval force to expel Argentina from the Falkland Islands and the other subsidiary 
islands.  She also set about to alienate and politically deny Argentina any international 
support for its cause. This was accomplished by getting UN Security Council resolutions 
passed condemning Argentine aggression and by persuading the United States to support 
Britain.  
D. REPUTATION 
A state’s reputation is linked to its credibility.  In the Falkland Islands conflict, 
Britain had continually undermined its credibility and reputation of being tough by not 
producing any threats to prevent Argentine aggressiveness; then ruthlessly backing them 
up.  In fact, when the going got tough, the British resorted to negotiations to try and settle 
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the dispute. The decision to use force went against PM Thatcher’s previous emphasis 
upon negotiations. Her government had the reputation for not using the threat of force to 
reinforce diplomacy and deterrence.366 The Argentineans learned this lesson from the 
events that occurred in 1976. During March and April 1982, many in Parliament did not 
believe the fleet would have to fight and many more believed the fleet’s role was to assist 
in negotiations for a successful resolution of the conflict.367 Thus, even as war was about 
to begin, Britain’s reputation of negotiating rather than fighting was being reinforced.  
After the invasion, Britain was worried about its reputation and setting a 
precedence of not reacting. The memory of Munich (1938) was an important factor in 
Britain’s decision to go to war. This is because Britain and other Western powers had 
ceded land and parts of a state (despite the will and self-determination of the 
Czechoslovak peoples) to Germany in order to avoid war and maintain peace.  The 
British government was not willing to do this again.368 Argentina was also worried about 
its reputation domestically. Although, it was not fully prepared for war in April, the Junta 
needed to appear strong internationally in order to maintain domestic support.369 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Argentine decision to attack the Falkland Islands and end this dispute was 
partially caused by Britain’s lack of credibility and its reputation for negotiating rather 
than fighting. Britain never clarified whether or not the Falkland Islands were a national 
interest that it was prepared to defend militarily. British attempts at deterrence in the 
1970s were secretive and therefore useless. Its attempt at immediate deterrence in 1982 
should have been a policy of compellance. British policy makers and military leaders 
believed they did not have the capability to deny Argentine aggression in the South 
Atlantic despite evidence and options to the contrary. Once acts of aggression were 
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committed, Britain refused to punish them. All of these credibility issues gave Britain a 
reputation (within the South Atlantic) for preferring to negotiate rather than fight. All of 
these factors impacted the cost/ benefit analysis of both Argentina and Britain, which is 








VII. COST/ BENEFIT CALCULATIONS 
The cost of a thing is the amount of what I will call life which is required 
to be exchanged for it, immediately or in the long run. 
Henry David Thoreau370 
Traditionally, cost/benefit analysis is associated with the military aspects of 
deterrence and war. For example, Mearsheimer claimed that cost is directly associated 
with the speed and success of military action; if the action is successful and fast, the costs 
of the operation will remain low.371 Yet, as this thesis has argued thus far, successful 
conventional deterrence depends upon the synchronization of political and military 
planning which generates a state’s capabilities. It is these capabilities that determine the 
types and credibility of various threats. It is insufficient to examine only cost/ benefit 
calculations based upon military aspects of deterrence, as Mearsheimer suggests.  
Additionally, the cost/ benefit analysis must include the short and long-term impacts of 
threats.  
One basic assumption underlying the cost/ benefit analysis is that effective 
deterrence makes the two concepts inversely related.  As the costs of an object increase, 
the benefits decrease, and vice versa. Given the relationship between costs and benefits, 
this chapter will focus upon Britain’s political and military ambivalence to the South 
Atlantic region which failed to convince Argentina that the costs (both long- and short-
term) of invading the Falkland Islands far outweighed the benefits. This will be 
accomplished by examining the cost/ benefit calculus through the political and military 
lenses developed in Chapter IV. 
A. POLITICAL  
Control over the Falkland Islands had both short and long term costs for both the 
British and Argentineans. For Britain this cost came in the form of international prestige 
                                                 
370 Henry David Thoreau, "Cost Quote," http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/cost.html 
(accessed 12/27/2009). 
371 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 24. 
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and leadership regarding liberal ideals such as freedom and democracy. The Argentineans 
claimed that the sovereignty over the Falkland Islands was a decolonization issue and that 
Britain should give up its claims over the islands. In pursuing this goal, the Argentineans 
attempted to increase the long-term costs of British sovereignty over the islands by 
gathering support within the UN to identify the Falkland Islands as a decolonization 
issue. In the 1960-70s, decolonization was a major issue and international pressure was 
put on all the former colonial powers to decolonize their foreign possessions. Argentina 
hoped that by increasing the British political costs over maintaining the islands, the 
benefits of maintaining physical control over them would decrease.  However, Argentina 
failed to recognize the ramifications of any British decision over the sovereignty issues 
and the overall long-term costs to the British Commonwealth and associated benefits. To 
be sure, any British decision regarding the Falkland Islands would set a precedent for 
other British holdings, to include Gibraltar, Belize, and Northern Ireland. Although, the 
regional short-term costs of the islands for Britain had risen, Argentina had failed to raise 
Britain’s global long-term costs and affect the long-term benefits associated with those 
costs.  
Britain’s counter to the decolonization costs was the islander self-determination 
issue.  From the beginning, the Falkland Islanders were British citizens and refused to be 
anything different.  As long as this remained the case, the long-term costs to Argentina 
remained high with little long-term political benefit in forcefully resolving the matter.  
This is because one of the United Nations’ founding principles was the self-determination 
of peoples around the world and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus, the UN 
General Assembly resolutions calling upon Britain and Argentina to negotiate the 
Falkland Islands issue actually runs counter to these foundational principles; therefore the 
short-term high benefits of the decolonization issue to Argentina could not be turned into 
long-term costs to Britain.  
Britain had also politically kept the short-term Argentinean use of force costs high 
and benefits low by continuing to negotiate the issue of island sovereignty with 
Argentina. Starting in 1980, this political cost/ benefit calculus changed due to the failure 
of the lease back agreement and the withdrawal of automatic citizenship to the Falkland 
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Islanders. Negotiations ceased to be a mechanism for keeping Argentinean use of force 
costs high and Britain undercut its argument of protecting its citizens. Thus, the overall 
costs of Argentine military action had significantly decreased from an Argentinean point 
of view. This led to the situation in which the perceived low cost of invasion promised 
the high benefits of regaining the islands.  
The second dimension of political costs was the economic concerns of the islands 
in the form of resource exploitation and logistical support. The Falkland Islands were 
heavily dependent upon Britain for education, medical care, mail, and transportation, 
among other things. Despite extensive wool exports to Britain372, the physical costs of 
maintaining the Falkland Islands remained high with perceived low benefits. In the 
1970s, Britain attempted to decrease some political costs (decolonization) and economic 
costs (life support) by contracting services out to Argentina.  The benefits to Britain were 
high as they were able to shift the burden for supporting the islands onto the 
Argentineans and appear to be incompliance with UN mandates.  
During the mid-1970s, the possibility of greater resource exploitation (undersea 
oil and fisheries) began to potentially have a positive impact on the costs of Britain’s 
logistical support for the islands. Consequently, the possibility arose that the economic 
costs of Britain’s retaining sovereignty over the islands were to decrease while 
significantly increasing its long-term regional economic benefits. However, the 
Argentineans were able to maintain the British at the negotiations table by sustaining 
Britain’s high short-term economic costs through the careful application of credible 
threats to withhold logistical support to the islands. Until 1981, the British overall costs 
of maintaining the islands remained high while the overall benefits remain low (despite 
the potential untapped regional resources.) 
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Britain did not actively attempt to affect Argentina’s cost/ benefit calculations. 
Given the dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel and associated 
islands, Britain’s use of this quarrel might have been an effective measure to affect 
Argentina’s political and economic costs in the region. The loss of the Beagle Islands 
severely undercut Argentina’s regional influence within the South Atlantic Ocean. Any 
relationship between Britain and Chile would have significantly increased Argentina’s 
expected costs for achieving regional hegemony and reacquiring the Falkland Islands. 
Any transfer of costs to Chile would have decreased Britain’s reliance on Argentina and 
reduced its need to negotiate the sovereignty issue over the islands. The overall result 
would have created a situation in which Argentina would not have gained any benefits 
from economic threats against the islands. After the Falkland Islands War, Britain did in 
fact enter into agreements with Chile for logistical support of the islands.373 If Britain’s 
economic costs could have been effectively dealt with, then Britain could have focused 
on how to more effectively affect Argentina’s military costs of hostile regional activity. 
B. MILITARY 
Until the Argentine invasion in 1982, Britain considered the military costs of the 
islands to be high with very little benefit. These costs grew from 1976 onward due to the 
atrophied South Atlantic British defense structure and ongoing Argentine aggression. 
Argentina had escalated the overall military costs to the British with each successive 
aggressive action in the region. When Argentina attacked the RSS Shackleton, the British 
did not have any forces in the area to protect its interests. As a result of this incident, the 
British stationed a platoon of Royal Marines on the islands.374  The British increased 
their short-term costs, while decreasing their benefits from the region as their shipping 
remained under threat of Argentine intervention. Conversely, Britain did not take any 
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steps to increase Argentine military costs and decreasing their corresponding benefits as 
well.  After the RSS Shackleton incident, Britain continued to negotiate the sovereignty of 
the Falkland Islands without significantly increasing British naval presence in the region 
to deter further acts of Argentinean aggression. Through ceasing negotiations, Britain 
could have considerably increased Argentine costs while simultaneously decreasing their 
benefits by threatening Argentina’s stated goal of recovering the islands. 
As a result of Britain’s insufficient response to the RSS Shackleton, the Argentine 
Junta decided to occupy South Thule Island in late 1976.  This move was aimed at 
increasing the regional costs to Britain by demonstrating its impotence in preventing 
Argentina’s freedom of action. Upon discovering the Argentine occupation force on 
South Thule Island, Britain could have raised its short-term military costs by sending a 
reinforced naval unit to the South Atlantic to remove the occupation forces and protect its 
regional interests.  These short-term costs could have been outweighed by the long-term 
costs and benefits of Britain’s demonstration and willingness to use force in protecting its 
regional interests and not tolerating Argentine aggressiveness. As it stands, Britain earned 
a reputation of willing to negotiate over going to war which further increased its overall 
long-term regional costs with associated decreased benefits.  
The Nott Defence Review in 1982 also affected the cost/ benefit calculus of both 
Britain and Argentina. This review simultaneously increased Britain’s costs while 
decreasing Argentina’s costs of military activity by bringing the two states parity of 
forces closer together.  This review increased Britain’s short and long term global costs 
by ignoring Britain’s lack of sea-based airborne early warning radar capability that 
conventional carriers offer, downsizing their carrier force to two, scrapping the Royal 
Navy’s amphibious assault ships, and focusing Britain’s overall forces upon NATO with 
only token out-of-area naval cruises. While these decisions were being made, Argentina 
was building up its military infrastructure and capabilities to decrease its regional military 
costs. By 1982, Argentina’s major military weakness was its non-existent anti-submarine 
warfare capability. The relative regional parity of forces between Britain and Argentina 
further decreased Argentine costs for invading the Falklands, while providing a high 
payoff benefit of domestic support.  
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C. CREDIBILITY, REPUTATION, AND COST/BENEFIT 
By March 1982, Britain was forced to accept the high short and long-term costs of 
its previous political and military policies. It had developed a reputation for preferring to 
negotiate the sovereignty issue rather than upset its political, economic, and military 
relations with Argentina. This reputation had undercut Britain’s regional credibility 
resulting in automatic high costs to any British activity regarding the Falkland Islands. 
Thus, on the eve of war, the Thatcher government faced the high costs of losing power by 
either weakly responding to the invasion or militarily failing to re-conquer the Falkland 
Islands. On the other hand, Argentine fears of a potential British preemptive action375 
caused them to change their timeline drastically increasing its costs for invading the 
islands. The original timeline created a situation of a perceived low cost fait accompli 
action that could have succeeded due to Britain’s decreased capabilities and high costs to 
respond. In April 1982, Britain clearly demonstrated that it was willing to fight a war in 
the South Atlantic and it had gained international support for its cause against Argentina. 
The Junta’s premature action forced them to continue the high cost political and military 
risks with rapidly decreasing benefits. As it stands, Britain’s political and military 
ambivalence to the South Atlantic region and inattention to the cost/ benefit analysis of 
the developing situation failed to instill fear in Argentina that the costs (both long and 
short term) of invading the Falkland Islands far outweighed the benefits. 
  
 
                                                 
375 Chapter III discussed the reasons behind Argentina moving up its original timeline from October 
1982 to April 1982.  Parts of the reasons were the Davidoff incident and Argentina’s UN Ambassador 
Costa Mendes’ speeches in March 1982.  
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VIII. LESSONS ABOUT CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE AND 
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 
Folly [is having] bad judgment of affairs, bad counsel, bad fellowship, 
bad use of one’s resources, false opinions about what is fine and good in 
life. Folly is accompanied by unskillfulness, ignorance, uncontrol, 
awkwardness, forgetfulness. 
Aristotle376 
As a result of the Falkland Islands War, Argentina will most likely never see 
sovereignty over the islands. Britain solidified its commitment to the islands and 
expanded the existing runway and built another runway to accept military aircraft and 
logistical support. The Royal Marine element was replaced by an Army company with 
relevant support package. The Royal Navy has a frigate or destroyer on patrol in the area, 
an offshore patrol vessel permanently stationed there, the HMS Endurance, and routine 
unpublicized patrols by nuclear-powered submarines. The Royal Air Force stations on the 
islands four multi-role combat aircraft, a C-130, aerial refuelers, and airbase protection 
equipment.377 All these measures are designed around a policy of deterrence to protect 
the Falkland Islands and British regional interests.  
Another result of the Falkland Islands War is that the islands are now classified as 
a British overseas territory with their own constitution and have attained a measure of 
economic independence through regulation of the regions natural resources and exports 
of wool. Although, the UN Decolonization Council routinely revisits the sovereignty 
issue of the Falkland Islands, Britain claims self-determination of the islanders and points 
to their constitution as proof of this fact and to rebuff their interference.378 Relations 
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between Britain and Argentina continue to be strained because of the status of the islands 
and their regional resource exploitation. Flare-ups of diplomatic hostility have occurred 
between Britain and Argentina; these have typically coincided with more conservative 
governments in Argentina. 379 Overall, post-war British deterrence appears to remain 
steady due to a concerted and deliberate British effort.  
A. HYPOTHESIS VALIDITY 
This thesis began with the question: “Why was conventional deterrence unable to 
prevent interstate armed conflict during the Cold War; and, what lessons can be learned 
from conventional deterrence failures?” It was hypothesized that “deterrence did not 
prevent regional conventional wars and conflicts because the deterrer failed to present 
credible threats that could be used to manipulate the opponent’s behavior, activities, cost/ 
benefit analysis, and instill a fear of unacceptable losses.” In the case of the Falkland 
Islands, this hypothesis proved correct. Britain failed to produce organized credible 
threats to manipulate Argentina’s behavior and cost benefit analysis resulting in Britain’s 
inability to instill a fear of unacceptable losses in Argentina.  
The reasons behind Britain’s failure to deter Argentine aggression against the 
Falkland Islands come from many sources. One source was British political and military 
planning; it resulted in ambiguous governmental actions that never combined to give the 
British government opportunities to leverage effective threats against Argentina. Even 
when Britain wanted to use deterrence, it ineffectively did so as the negligible effects of 
Britain’s 1977 attempt clearly demonstrates. Britain also did not fully understand how to 
use deterrence; the crisis in March 1982 demonstrated the need for compellance (forcing 
Argentina to stop a series of activities) versus Britain’s renewed weak attempt at 
deterrence to prevent an activity. In early March 1982, only a clear British demonstration 
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of its willingness to use force could have prevented war as Argentine military 
preparations for invasion were already under way; and this did not happen. 
Another source of Britain’s inability to successfully threaten Argentina came from 
the psychological limitations accrued by rational actions and policy decisions. Britain 
failed to acknowledge that it and Argentina had very different perceptions of the issue 
over the Falkland Islands sovereignty. British refusal to accept that Argentina wanted to 
reacquire the Falkland Islands by any means necessary derives in part because Britain 
was wholly unprepared both politically and militarily to  invest a significant interest in 
the islands. This set of situations led to an extreme form of cognitive dissonance within 
the British government in which as late as March 1982, Britain was still unwilling to 
accept the facts that Argentina was gearing up to invade the islands. 
A third source of British ineffective potential for threats resulted from a lack of 
credibility and reputation. By 1982 in the South Atlantic, Britain had lost all credibility 
for protecting the Falkland Islands. It had gained a reputation for preferring to negotiate 
rather than fight because it refused to threaten or punish Argentina for aggressive actions; 
despite a British Royal Survey Ship being fired upon and the occupation of South Thule 
Island. Additionally, after these hostile actions were taken; Britain never issued any 
threats against Argentina to prevent such actions in the future, resulting in zero British 
credibility for being able to protect its interests.  
The lack of Argentinean beliefs in British credibility and reputation resulted in the 
fifth source of ineffective threats. Britain never effectively altered Argentina’s regional 
cost/ benefit calculus.  Overt acts of deterrence could have accomplished this goal, or 
improving British/Chilean relations would also have accomplished threatening 
Argentina’s cost/benefit calculus. Instead, Britain’s ambiguous political and military 
policies had a cumulative effect of decreasing Argentina’s perceived costs while 
increasing its benefits. All five sources had a snowballing effect upon Britain’s inability 
to present credible threats to Argentina to either change its behavior and/or its 
cost/benefit analysis. 
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B. LESSONS LEARNED ON CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE 
There are many lessons to be learned from the Falkland Islands case study in 
regards to conventional deterrence.  One important lesson from this case study harkens 
back to the policy debates on deterrence discussed in Chapter II. A state that ignores 
deterrence will in the long run be incapable of effectively issuing threats against an 
opponent to prevent unwanted behavior from occurring. The planning requirements 
behind deterrence necessarily require options to be created and thought about. These 
options create alternative courses of action that differ from the current ones being 
pursued. Additionally, deterrence theory (regardless of whether or not one believes in it) 
necessarily forces both political and military planning and their synchronization 
throughout government, enabling coherence within policy and actions. 
Moreover, the options created under a policy of deterrence help reduce the causes 
and effects of cognitive dissonance. Chapter V put forward the idea that a major source of 
Britain’s cognitive dissonance resulted from that lack of options, which was compounded 
by defensive avoidance and selective exposure to information.  If one works to avoid 
these pitfalls, it is imperative to build upon solid foundations that deterrence theory and 
strategy assist in creating.  
Credibility and reputation are also important to a state regardless of whether or 
not they follow a policy of deterrence. Furthermore, the theory and strategy of deterrence 
presents a guide for states on how to create and maintain its credibility within regions and 
on issues.  But again, it is important to have a clear concise political policy synchronized 
with appropriate military capabilities from which to create this credibility and reputation. 
Finally, cost/ benefit analysis is important when tied to credibility and reputation.  If a 
state does not maintain its credibility and reputation then it takes a lot more effort for a 
state to raise the costs and decrease the benefits of an opponent’s actions. A policy of 
deterrence can be an effective method for affecting the cost/ benefit analysis when 
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Figure 1.   South Atlantic Ocean380 
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Figure 2.   Geopolitical Area of Interest: The South Atlantic381 
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1982 (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1991), xxiii. 
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Figure 3.   Argentine Military Locations382 
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Figure 4.   Close-up of Falkland Island and Dependencies383 
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Figure 5.   Falkland Islands384 
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Figure 6.   South Georgia Island385 
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Figure 7.   South Thule Island386 
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